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PART I. INTRODUCTION 
Recognising th e law as a form of social control with the criminal 
justice system as its enforcement agency, the essential theme of 
any questions about it must be the problem of individual 
responsibility. The concept of individual responsibility, 
which provides the tacit foundation of this control by means 
of an abstr a ct body of norms, implies a certain freedom of choice 
in one's actions and accountability for that choice. Thus only 
if it is assumed that everyone is capable of making a rational 
decision as to their actions, is capable of complying with 
the expectations of the law and is of equal competence before 
the law, can justice be guaranteed. There are, however, members 
of society who do not meet these criteria. 
While New Zealand's criminal law and criminal justice system do 
recognise that not all individuals can be held fully responsible 
for their anti-social behaviour and that not all are equally 
competent before the law, the case of the intellectually 
handicapped offender can present unique problems in the administration 
of justice. 
This paper examines the significance of a person's intellectual 
handicap in his or her involvement with the criminal law, passage 
through the criminal justice system and possible diversion to the 
mental health system. Its ultimate aim is to assess whether, in 
all cases, justice can at present be guaranteed. 
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PART II. INTELLECTUAL HANDICAP 
To discuss the potential significance of intellectual handicap 
in criminal justice and the system's treatment of I.H. offend e rs, 
it is ess e ntial to proceed with a sound background knowledge of 
the nature and consequences of the condition. 
A. Intellectual Handicap - Definition 
The term "int e ll e ctual handicap" > and its corollary "the intelle ctually 
handicapped 111 are generally used in this paper in preference to 
the variety of other terms applied to the condition (chiefly, 
"mental retardation", "mental deficiency", "mental s-., S. n or m a 1 i t y " ) • 
It is a term commonly used in New Zealand and is also that preferr e d 
by the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped Inc.f 
the organisation working to meet the needs and promote the welfar e 
. of the intellectually handicapped in New Zealand. Furthermore, 
this trrminology is seen as including the personal and social 
consequences of the condition, which are as significant in this 
study as the fact of the retardation itself. 
Intellectual handicap is a condition which has proven extremely 
difficult to define as it does not appear "in the same form, to 
the same degree, at the same moment, because of the same 
circumstances, and with the same consequences for all ljH peoplJ. 113 
The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that so many different 
s p e c i al i s t gr o u p s are inter e s t e d i n the medic a l , be h a v i our al a ,-. c' 
educational manifestations of the condition. 
.. ' 
3. 
Despite the lack of agreement among the various disciplines, 
the American Association on Mental Deficiency proposed a 
definition which has met with the approval of most professional 
groups. It states that "mental retardation refers to subaverage 
general intellectual functioning which originates during the 
developmental period and is associated with impairment in one or 
more of the following: (l) maturation, (2) learning, and (3) social 
adjustment. 114 
Critical portions of the definition were explained: 
.. 
1) "General intellectual functioning implies that the individual 
has been evaluated with an instrument ., or test, which is of 
sufficient scope to consider as many of the measurable traits 
of intelligence as possible or practical. 
2) "Developmental period" extends from conception to age sixteen. 
3) "Maturation" ref er s to the rate and degree to wh i eh deve lo pme nt 
of basic skills most commonly associated with infancy and 
childhood occur. 
4) "Learning" refers to the ease with which the individual is 
able to gain knowledge through experience. 
5) "Social adjustment" refers to how well the individual is able 
to exercise independence in self-maintenance within the 
community and in employment. 
The N.Z.S.I.H. accepts the following working definition: 
"The term 'intellectual handicap' refers to people who are unable 
to lead independent lives run the community because of reduced 
intellectual functioning and impaired social adaptation." 
4. 
"Impaired social adaptation" refers to difficulties in meeting 
the standard of competence, independence and social responsibility 
that is expected of a given age group in our society. 
B. The Levels of Intellectual Handicap 
Although impaired social adjustment and social competence are 
as important as the psychometric criteria in defining intellectual 
handicap, the IH are often classified according to degree of 
retardation on the basis of their IQ scores. While such 
classification is not a reliable indicator of the degree of 
intellectual handicap and therefore provides little other than a 
basis for stereotyping, it is in wide use throughout the world, 
including New Zealand. 
The World Health Organisation recognises five categories of mental 
retardation: 
borderline IQ 71-75 
mild IQ 52-70 
moderate IQ 36-51 
severe IQ 20-35 
:.\ profound IQ below 20 5 
Independent of the classification based on IQ scores, four general. 
levels of intellectual handicap have been established - mild, 
moderate, severe and profound. A useful description of these 
levels was included in the Report of the President's Committee 
on Mental Retardation:
6 
The mildly mentally retarded group would include 
individuals who, in all likelihood, are identified by 
the public school system as retarded. Depending upon 
the general behaviour of these individuals and the 
programs available in the school system, they may or 
5 • 
may not be placed in special classes. Moreover, after 
completion of school, commonly they are absorbed into 
the total adult population and are not readily identifiable. 
These are individuals who generally work in competitive 
jobs and who, provided they have no physical or emotional 
problems in addition to their retardation, are able to 
lead independent lives. 
The moderately mentally retarded are more 
limited in their capabilities. Generally they will be 
identified before entering school and need special pre-
school and school programs. These children are most 
likely to be placed in classes for the trainable mentally 
retarded. As adults, they usually are able to live and 
work in the community, but need some type of sheltered 
environment or supervision in order to function optimally. 
The severe and profound levels G-nclude individualJ 
many whose problems can be identified at, or shortly after, 
birth. Individuals functioning at this level are much 
more dependent, need more intensive programming and 
frequently have physical problems in addition to the 
retardation in mental development. 
The practical utility of definitions and categorisations of 
intellectual handicap should not be overestimated. The accepted 
definitions are purposely broad in order to encompass all levels 
of intellecual handicap; the categorisation of the IH into mild, 
moderate, severe or profound groups amounts to no-,· more than a 
label which denotes in general terms the type of IH person concerned. 
Accordingly, the relevance of categorisation to the criminal justice 
system must be very general. 
6 • 
Categorisation is, however; necessary in the present study of 
IH offenders. As shall be seen, the behaviour and deficiencies 
to be expected of a mildly IH person cannot be placed on the same 
footing as those to be expected of a severely IH person. Nor can 
criminal justice be applied to or affect individuals within the 
different categories in the same manner. 
The groups most litely to come into contact with the criminal 
justice system and likely to present the greatest difficulties 
are the midly and moderately retarded, the ultimate question always 
being whether the principles and methods of the criminal justice 
system can be properly applied to them and, if not, what course 
of action is appropriate. All groups are, however, of concern 
to this study. Differentiation is made wherever appropriate. 
C. Problems Related to Intellectual Handicap and 
the Consequences thereof 
As has been indicated, the IH are not a homogene:.ous group. Special 
care must be taken in attempting to categorise IH adults, the 
concern of this pape~, given the great disparity between each 
individual's background and characteristics. 
Smith has noted a number of circumstances contributing to 
individual and group differences among IH adults and which may 
play a role in shaping their character and destiny~
7 
1) The different degrees of multiple disability present at 
birth, including the level of congenital mental subnormality. 
2) The type of environment with which the IH adult was associated 
during the childhood and adolescent years. For example, if 
proper diagnosis and comprehensive treatment were provided in 
a relatively enriched environment, the IH person is more 
.. , 
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likely to reach adulthood with more positive signs and a 
more favourable prognosis than those persons whose surroundings 
were less stimulating during the vital formative years. 
3) How the IH adult sees himself or herself in an occupational 
sense, socially, personally and intellectually. The more 
positive the self-concept, the better the IH adult will be 
able to function in an effective and independent manner. 
4) The family environment in which the IH adult was reared. For 
example, the more accepting, supportive and healthy the family 
environment, the better the person's future adult behaviour 
and his or her chances for success and self-sufficiency. 
5) The type of educational programme to which the IH person has 
been exposed. As the IH adult is provided with a stimulating 
and properly sequenced series of educational experiences 
beginning at the earliest possible period and extending into 
adulthood, he or she can reasonably be expected to develop 
progressively higher levels of skill, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, as he or she moves into adulthood. 
Bearing these differences in mind, there is a wide range of 
characteristics and problems commonly associated with intellectual 
handicap which may affect an IH person's behaviour and may, in 
given circumstances, lead to behaviour ordinarily labelled as 
criminal. 
~f ••• ' -.~ - . 
Many IH are unable to judge the appropriateness of their responses 
to a particular situation and to foresee the consequences of their 
actions. For example, an IH person may not understand that the 
goods attractively displayed in a shop cannot simply be taken if 
they appeal to him or her. More commonly, the behaviour of an 
-m 
-----
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IH person, such as acting in an overly friendly manner towards a 
total stranger, can be seriously misinterpreted by society. An 
IH person may not know when or how to choose between right and 
wrong; indeed, he or she may not be aware of the difference 
between right and wrong behaviour. Further, the person may be 
easily influenced by others in whom he or she places unquestioning 
trust. An IH person will not necessarily know how to deal with 
a new situation, not only because of the reduced intellectual 
functioning but also because of a lack of previous opportunities 
to practice appropriate responses. 
Related to this are problems in abstract thinking) such that an 
IH person has difficulty in grasping complex ideas or expressions 
and may have difficulty in adapting to unfamiliar people and 
surroundings. 
An IH person may have difficulty in focusing attention on a 
specific task for a long period of time and may be easily distracted 
by peripheral external stimuli which to the average person would 
be of little or no importance at the particular moment. The 
short memory of many IH aggravates this problem. 
Even where the IH person suffers from no secondary speech impairments, 
he or she may have difficulty in communicating thoughts and ideas 
to others. 
These cognitive inadequacies which may restrict the IH person in 
satisfactorily responding to a particular situation or problem are 
at odds with their social, emotional and other personal needs. 
IH adults have the same basic types of needs, wishes and attitujes 
as the rest of the adult population. Whereas their physical and 
material nee ds are usually met satisfactorily, other vital needs 
----
Im 
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are often overlooked. Those of particular potential concern 
are love, belongingness, recognition by others, usefulness, 
praise, opportunities to be actively and meaningfully involved 
in a task, freedom to satisfy one's curiosity and to learn about 
new and interesting things.
8 
The consequences of these needs not 
being satisfied on a regular and intentional basis may be serious. 
The extent of previous failures, rebuke, rejection by others and 
general feelings of inadequacy may result in a number of damaging 
secondary character traits. The IH person may develop any one 
or more of the following: low tolerance for frustration, unwilling-
ness to consider new ideas, approaches to a problem or engagement 
in new activities, regression to earlier more satisfying and 
successful styles of behaviour, low concepts of self-worth, ability 
and chance for success, a general lack of spontaneity.
9 
The frequency and magnitude of the proble~s noted will result in 
different types of behaviour according to the particular IH person. 
Unstable and antisocial behaviour may accompany all degrees of 
retardation, except the most profound, in which existence is 
almost completely passive.
10 It may take the form of temper 
outbursts, aggressive or destructive behaviour towards other people, 
the perso~ hlmself or objects, sullenness, withdrawn or isolation-
istic behaviour. The types of antisocial behaviour that may 
accompany intellectual handicap are considered more fully in 
Part III. 
There are certain other problems which IH people may have which 
are not necessarily related to their mental and emotional difficulties. 
Unusual facial features, an unusual gait, poor co-ordination, soeech, 
hearing or visual Impairments and epileptic seizures are examples 
of the range of disorders from which some IH persons suffer. 
10. 
D. The Prevalence of Intellectual Handicap in New Zealand 
The most recent figures showing the prevalence of intellectual 
handicap in New Zealand are those published in 1976 by the 
Research Foundation of the N.Z.S.I ~- as the result of a 
. 'd 11 nat1onw1 e survey. 
The survey sample consisted of those IH persons below sixty five 
years of age who lived in, or whose home address was in, one of 
12 
the representative regions surveyed. For the purposes of 
inclusion in the survey, the IH met one or more of the following 
criteria: 
1) Those excluded from ordinary schooling, or unable to obtain 
regular, independent employment because of intellectual 
limitations. 
2) Those living in psychopaedic, psychiatric or public hospitals 
with a primary diagnosis of mental retardation. 
3) Those receiving an invalids benefit on the ground of mental 
retardation. 
4) Those considered to be ~oderately or ~ore severely retarded 
according to WHO classification, either from formal 
psychometric testing or as judged by expert professional 
opinion and treated as mentally retarded. 
, ::-- . 
All available official and voluntary sources were used to identify 
and locate the IH in each of the survey regions. The ~ational 
Health Statistics Centre provided records and addresses of all 
those in psychopaedic and psychiatric hospitals with a diagnosis 
of mental retardation. It was more difficult to locate all of 
the IH in the community, though most were known to such agencies 
as the Psychologi ml Service of the Department of Education, Child 
11. 
Lfealth Clinics, the Department of Social Welfare, the tnSIH, 
and a number of other community agencies. 
It should be observed that the majority of IH persons in New 
Zealand do come to official notice at some stage or other in their 
life. Exception has to be made for some borderline cases and 
perhaps some cases where an IH person is born to a family of low 
socio-economic status, in a remote rural environment. If not 
identified as IH at birth or in early childhood by medical or 
childcare personnel, official identification will most often 
occur in the school years when the child is found to have impaired 
intelligence and learning difficulties. More rarely, identification 
will occur upon application to the Department of Social Welfare 
for an invalids benefit. At any stage of his or her life, the IH 
person may become involved, or at least known to, IHC or another 
community organisation. This will most often be upon the 
initiative of parents, relatives or friends. 
The survey authors estimated the national prevalence rate of 
intellectual handicap as 3.5 per thousand of the population. 13 
Marked variations were reported in the prevalence rate at different 
ages, as is shown in the following table: 
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IH By Age Number Percentage Prevalence per Thousand 
of Population 
0-4 189 7.89 2.25 
5-9 362 15 .11 4.20 
10-14 339 14-.15 4.07 
15-19 373 15.57 5.14 
20-29 497 20.74 4.17 
30-39 256 10.68 2.85 
40-49 192 8.00 2.16 
50-64 188 7.85 1.78 
·. TOTAL: 2396 100.00 3.29 
The authors attributed the low prevalence rate in early infancy to 
difficulties in detection, and the decline in prevalence from 
early adulthood onwards to the shorter life expectancy of many 
profoundly retarded. To be noted is the peak rate in the 15-19 
year age group a~d the relatively high prevalence in young adults. 
This was thought to be possibly due to an influx of young adults 
into sheltered workshops and care centres or to the granting of 
the invalids benefit. 
Intellectual handicap was found to be more prevalent amongst males 
than females. Whereas the New Zealand population at the time of 
the 1971 census was almost equally divided between males and 
females, 1293 IH males were included in the survey as opposed to 
only 1103 IH females. IH males thus exceeded IH females by 7.92% .. 
This preponderance of males occurred at all ages up to forty. .~o 
clear reasons were suggested for this discrepancy. It may be 
that our society is more aware of inadequacies among males than 
among females because of differences in role expectations. 
The survey also revealed racial differences in the prevalence of 
intellectual handicap. Whereas according to the 1971 census 7.9% 
of t h e n a t i on a 1 po p u 1 a t i o n w a s M a or i , t h e ~fa or i I H f or me d 1 1. 3 % 
of the survey sample. European and other races accounted for 
88.73% of the IH population. 
---
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General demographic trends -were reflected in the age distribution 
of ~aori and European IH. At the time of the survey half of the 
~aori population was under fifteen years of age, compared with 
nearly one third of the total population. Similarly, half of 
the Maori IH were under fifteen compared with slightly more than 
one third of Europeans. The prevalence of intellectual handicap 
among Maori children aged between five and fourteen years was 
significantly greater than the prevalence among European children 
of similar age. Between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine 
the proportionate distribution. of the . two races was very much the 
same, but past the age of thirty, the prevalence of intellectual 
handicap was significantly lower among Maori adults than among 
Europeans. 
As to the prevalence of different degrees of retardation, it was 
found that 19.2% of the IH were mildly retarded, 37.51% were moderately 
retarded, 29.62% severely and 8.64% profoundly. The degree of 
retardation was not known for 5.03% of the IH population surveyed. 
These figures must, however, be qualified. In particular, the 
reportedly low prevalence of mild retardation is inconsistent 
with other overseas findings which would place most IH persons 
within this category •1
4 First, it must be pointed out that an 
assessment of mild mental retardation is commonly not made until 
late childhood or early adulthood, therefore very few mildly 
retarded infants were included in the survey sample. Secondly, the 
figures reflect to a certain extent the fact that a number of the 
milder cases will not have met the criteria for inclusion in the 
survey. Moreover, some will not have been known to the official 
a gene ies. 
.. / 
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There was found to be a disproportionately high number of 
young and older adults among the mildly retarded. This was said 
to reflect the influx of some school leavers and older adults into 
dependent conditions and surroundings. 
No significant differences were found in the proportionate 
distribution of Europeans and Maoris among the different degrees 
of retardation. 
Although many IH are free from physical disorders, many have poor 
physique, muscular weakness and poor motor co-ordination. The 
degrees of physical and intellectual handicap are generally closely 
related. A great majority of the sample (72.6%) suffered speech 
impairments, ranging from stammering to an inability to form other 
th . 1. d 15 an singe wor s. 
The survey authors also reported on problems of behaviour control, 
an area particularly relevant to this study. A distinction emerged 
between minor problems such as disobedience, stubbornness, temper 
tantrums, anxiety and excessive dependence, and major problems 
such as aggressiveness, destructiveness, unpredictability and 
violence. 
More than half of the IH were found to present no undue problems 
of behaviour control; close to one third presented minor problems, 
and one eighth were found to present major problems. The incidence 
of problems in behaviour control was closely related to age. 
Major problems were reported in 13.55% of young adults and in 8.33% 
of adults a~ e d thirty and over. Minor problems were found in !\, C.l i'. 
of 'j o ~,,... ~ a- cl - I h c,...... J : .-.. 
28.79% of adults aged thirty and over. The incidence of such 
problems was again closely related to the degree of retardation. 
-
Im 
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Minor problems occurred most frequently among the mildly and 
moderately retarded, and in approximately one third of each 
of these categories. They decreased with the severity of 
retardation. Major problems of control occurred fairly 
consistently in all categories. 
Of further relevance are the survey's findings on the residential 
care of IH people. Obviously the greater the contact with the 
community, the greater the possibility of contact with the 
criminal justice system. Of the IH in the sample, it was found 
that 53.5% lived at home, 39.9% were cared for in hospitals and 
\ 5" 0. 
6.6% were full-time residents of IHC and other hostels. 
Significant differences were reported in the patterns of 
residential care of Maori and European IH. Of the IH in the 
non-~aori group, 52.3% were cared for at home and 41.2% were 
cared for in hospital. The corresponding figures for the Maori 
group were 63.2% and 29.6%. The proportions in hostel care were 
not significantly different. These figures reflect the concept 
of the extended family in Maori culture. Of all the IH living at 
home and thus in greater contact with the community, almost one 
half were moderately and almost one quarter mildly retarded. 
Of those in hospital care, the authors note only in respect of 
the mildly retarded that some had beeA committed by the courts 
because of deviant or unacceptable behaviour in the community. 
------------
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E. Common Conceptions of the Intellectually Handicapped 
General public attitudes to the IH range from pity and over-
protectiveness to fear, rejection and a perceived need to 
segregate this group from the mainstream of society. These derive 
largely from the perpetuation of a number of myths, and may affect 
the treatment of an IH person at various stages in the criminal 
justice system. 
Those misconceptions relating to anti-social behaviour of the IH 
are more appropriately discussed in Part III in the context of 
the relation between intellectual handicap and criminality. 
1. "An I H person can be id en t if i e d by hi s or her 1 o o k s and 
behaviour." 
There is as enormous a variation in appearance among the IH 
as there is among the general population. While some IH 
can be identified by their physical features, such as those with 
Down's Syndrome, and some have physical handicaps in addition 
to the intell e ctual handicap, others are perfectly normal in 
appearance. The appearance of a person is no sure indicabion 
of intellectual handicap or of the degree of handicap. 
Nor are behaviour or personality reliable indicators. While all 
are of reduced intelligence, some IH are slow and placid, others 
nervous and kinetic. Some project joyous and sunny personalities, 
others depression and gloom.
16 
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2. "Intellectual handicap · is hereditary" 
This is simply not true. IH parents may have children of normal 
intelligence, just as parents of normal intelligence may have IH 
off spring. 
However, research does support the view that intellectual 
handicap may be familial, in the sense that families with low 
socio-economic status and a poor living environment are more prone 
to having retarded children who then grow up and have retarded 
children of their own.
17 The most obvious factor in this 
cultural-familial cause of intellectual handicap is poverty, 
related to Malnutrition, inadequate or inappropriate stimulation 
in childhood, low level of education, poor ante-natal and post-
natal medical care, and health problems generally. 
3. "Intellectual handicap is irreversible." 
It is true to say that intellectual handicap is incurable. However, 
where it is a result of emotional deprivation in early childhood, 
the condition is reversible to some extent for those mildly 
retarded who suffer no brain da~age if proper environmental 
t t t . .d d t l t .bl 
18 
rea men is provi e a as ear y a s age as possi e. 
All IH people are seen as capable of improvement. 
4. "Intellectual handicap is a contagious disease." 
Intellectual handicap is not a disease. It is a condition which 
may result fro~ any number of circumstances that have the 
possibility of occurring before, during or after the birth of 
the child. It cannot be "caught" as a result of touching or being 
near someone identified as IH. 
--
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5. "The IH are more highly sexed than normal people." 
Research has shown conclusively that the IH have the same sexual 
drive as other people.
19 
Sexual drive and intensity vary as 
among others. The misconception may be based on the frequent 
inability of the IH to control their sexual urges or to channel 
them in what is regarded as an acceptable manner. 
6. ""The IH are more violent than other people." 
The IH are not more inherently aggressive or violent than other 
people. They react violently in the same situations in which 
others would be violent, for example.when frustrated, angry, 
afraid or threatened. This is discussed more fully in Part III A. 
7. "The IH have criminal tendencies." 
See Part III A. 
8. "Intellectual handicap is the same as mental illness" 
Intellectual handicap and mental illness are not the same. Mental 
illness is an emotional disturbance or psychiatric condition 
resulting from disease or psychological or social problems; it 
may be temporary or permanent, curable or incurable. On the 
other hand, mental retardation is a condition primarily 
characterised by substandard intellectual functioning. 
. 
The frequent confusion is partly attributable to the fact that 
the IH and the mentally ill may share some of the same characteristics. 
Like the mentally ill, some IH are angry~ hostile and sometimes 
withdrawn. Many mentally ill people do poorly on activities 
involving the use of intellectual skills and problem-solving 
techniques. Moreover, a dual diagnosis of intellectual handic~p 
• • • • • • • • ----• -
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and mental illne ss is not uncommon, given the state of 
20 
frustration in which the IH frequently find themselves. 
F. Current Trends in the Care, Training and Daily Living 
of the Intellectually Handicapped 
Current trends in the care, training, working and daily living 
of thi IH are characterised by three inter-related philosophies: 
1 . . . t t· d th l t t · t· 1 · 
21 
norma 1sat1on, 1n egra 10n an e eas res r1c 1ve a ternat1ve. 
The implementation of these philosophies should be encouraged in 
all aspects of the IH person's life • 
11·Normalisation" means making available to IH people patterns 
and conditions of everyday life which are as close as possible to 
the norms and patterns of the rest of society. This does not mean 
that the I~ will become "normal", nor that every IH person will 
11·1ive out 11· in the community, be placed in regular schools or 
participate in competitive employment • 
The main point of the doctrine of normalisation relates to the 
philosophy of the least restrictive alternative. As with any 
other person, limits on the IH person's right to self-determination 
should be imposed only in those areas and situations where there 
is no less restrictive alternative available. In other areas, 
the I~ person should be free to make decisions on both major and 
minor matters to the same extent as other people. 
11·Integration" is the realisation of the philosophy of 
normalisation. It refers to integration into a non-handicapped 
community, in all spheres of the IH person's life. 
,. , 
----m 
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The practical social significance of those philo!:q)hies currently 
being implemented is that the IH are now a much less segregated 
group than in th e past. Wherever possible, they are educated, 
live, socialise and work within the community. As members of the 
community, they will have to conform to its norms and rules. 
No doubt the implementation of these philosophies according to the 
IH person's needs, development and capabilities increases the 
likelihood of contact with the criminal justice system. More IH 
people are now growing up in a society that emphasises normality 
and achievement and not all will be able to conf o rm, within their 
limitations, to these demands. 
The fundamental. inference to be drawn from the foregoing 
presentation of background information on intellectual handicap 
is that its relevance to offending behaviour and the criminal 
justice system will always be very subjective. The level of 
retardation, the different intellectual, social and emotional 
problems which the IH person has, his or her environment and the 
sorts of public attitudes which he or she will be up against will 
be the main factors in distinguishing one case from another. 
- . .... 
-------------
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PART III. THE INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED AS OFFENDERS 
A. The Relation of Intellectual Handicap to Criminality 
In discussing the various ways in which society can deal with 
criminal offenders, one writer has commented that "how we view 
the offender affects what we do with him, and what, precisely, 
we hope to accomplish. 1122 
How we view and deal with a particular offender or class of 
offenders must be based not only on the effects of their actions, 
but also on how we perceive the offender in the first place and 
how we perceive his or her actions as being produced. Are these 
considerations such that the normal stereotypes cannot be applied 
to the offending behaviour and the ~:motivation behind it? 
The role of intellectual handicap is clearly significant in 
this context~as are the conceptions held by the general public 
and criminal justice agencies of the physical and mental 
characteristics associated with intellectual handicap. 
The problems commonly associated with intellectual handicap may 
account for anti-social or criminal behaviour in the IH. With lack 
of intelligence and understanding, lack of social and moral insight, 
lack of social experiences, low self-esteem and a low tolerance 
for frustration, some IH will be more prone to behaving anti-socially 
than is the average person. One must recognise, however, that 
"the average person" may also be deficient in any one or more of 
the above respects. 
Several other explanations have been offered. 
.. ' 
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In discussing the substandard personality development of some IH, 
GU1Z:burg writes that much of an IH person's unsatisfactory 
behaviour can be said to derive "from the panic reaction of the 
child in him, and is not due to some evil, or a bad streak." He 
or she "reacts inappropriately for age because of his under-
developed personality and he reacts excessively because he cannot 
cope with the environmental demands made upon him." Gunzburg 
further states that the combination of mature and immature aspects 
in the IH individual's personality can make his or her adjustment 
to the demands of society very precarious, and warns that it should 
not be assumed that his or her delinquencies are necessarily signs 
f b d 
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Another writer comments that the criminal behaviour of an IH 
person may be att ri buted to his awareness of being different. 
This "may be responsible for feelings of inferiority, frustration 
and resentment. These feelings are especially strong in the mildly 
retarded for they have a clearer recognition of how they differ from 
others. The result is a tendency to break down more easily under 
pressure or stress. Such knowledge may lead them to commit violent, 
aggressive or destructive acts which are often an attempt to gain 
attention and prestige." 24 
Another writer, Smith, noted the fact that ''retarded teenagers tend 
to be more responsive to affiliating with others who are trouble-
k ff . . 1125 ma ers, ru ians or agitators. He explained this using a 
"reward-punishment behaviour modification model": for many IH 
teenagers, attempting to behave in a socially proper way has not 
been a rewarding experience at all. As a result, the person is 
literally 'turned off' from subsequently attempting to conform to 
the set standards. 
----
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Smith also attributed the fact that some IH become members of 
anti-social groups to the normal need for social attachments. 
Naturally, young IH adults will actively seek out persons who 
either overlook or are not critical of their handicap and social 
inadequacies. By carrying out "missions" for the group, by doing 
their dirty work or playing a part in the plotting of criminal 
acts, these IH may be rewarded for their success. For once they 
will feel valued.
26 
The incidence of violent and aggressive behaviour among the IH 
is obviously relevant to criminality. That the IH are more 
violent and aggressive than people of normal intelligence would 
seem to be an entrenched public perception. This may not be 
totally unfounded as a generalisation, especially in view of the 
apparent public confusion of mental retardation with mental illness. 
It does, however, need qualifying. 
The fact of retardation itself does not mean that the IH person 
is naturally violent or aggressive. As has been pointed out, the 
IH react violently in the same situations in which others would 
be violent: when frustrated, angry, afraid or threatened. The 
point is that whereas the normal person will usually be able to 
exercise some control over such emotional impulses and will probably 
know that aggressiveness or violence are inappropriate or ineffective 
responses, many IH will not. They may be unable to curb the 
expression of their impulses and unable to grasp the significance 
of their actions. Thus when under pressure and with reduced 
control, the IH person may tend to act out directly. 27 
.. ' 
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While the situations engendering violent behaviour may be 
the same as for normal people, the IH person is likely to find 
himself or herself in such situations more frequently • 
The same sort of analysis can be applied to the public conception 
of the IH as having stronger criminal tendencies than other people. 
They are not inherently criminal because they are retarded. 
However, as has been seen, their intellectual, emotional and social 
deficiencies may lead them to criminal ways. Furthermore, these 
shortcomings mean that "once a subnormal has been started off on 
the wrong road the probability is that he will continue this way 
and the gap between his standards and those of society may become 
wider and wider. 1128
 
The importance of finding the most effective way of dealing with 
IH offenders is therefore obvious. 
B. The Incidence of Criminality among the Intellectually Handicapped 
Overseas research has been conducted on the incidence of criminality 
among the IH • In 1962 it was summarised thus:
29 
~ost studies indicate that the educable mentally retarded 
is represented by a higher delinquency and criminal 
rate than would be expected by their general prevalence 
in society. Here the problem i~ complicated by school 
failure, early drop-out, socio-economic status, 
difficulty in finding and retaining employment, 
inadequate societal planning for post-school life, etc. 
The borderline intellectual ability of the retardate is 
not seen as necessarily implying non-conforming or norm-
violating behaviour. However, the involved lack of insight 
or comprehension in such a technical, complex and rapidly 
changing society creates situations which seem to penalise 
---------------
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this . segment of our society. 
In 1963 and 1964, Brown and Courtless in the United States 
undertook a survey entitled "The Mentally Retarded Offender", 
which sought to examine certain aspects of intellig~nce in prison 
populations. 30 Using an IQ cut-off point of seventy, they found 
that approximately 20,000 of the 190,000 prisoners in the entire 
system were mentally retarded. That is, 10% of the prison 
population were retarded. 31 This takes on its significance when 
compared to the statistically projected 3% mental retardation figure 
for the entire United States. 
The figure of 10% was confirmed by Marsh, Friel and Eissler in 
1975. 32 Ogg, however, has pointed out that the actual number 
of IH in prison will vary according to the geographic region of 
the country. Thus in the midwest of the United States, only 2% 
of the prison population were identified ~s IH, while as many as 
27% were so identified in the south. 33 
Whether this 10% figure would accurately represent the New Zealand 
situation is unclear. 
The only relevant New Zealand survey was one carried out in 1978 
amongst the borstal population (fifteen to twenty year age group)} 4 
Not all inmates were tested for IQ. 
The survey was based on two IQ tests: Ravens Progressive Matri~es 
(a non-verbal IQ test) and the Otis Higher Examination (a test 
of verbal,or written, IQ). The results of the Otis test showed 
a high incidence of very low IQ. They were, however, said to be 
fairly unreliable since on a reading test, 24% of the inmates could 
read only up to the level of a ten year old. 
.. , 
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The Ravens test was said to be a better indicator. It revealed 
that 4.4% of European inmates scored in the bottom 5% of the general 
population int e llectu a lly. Of the Maori inmates, 7.7% scored in 
this bottom 5%. The survey authors concluded that 6.4% of the 
prison population scored in the bottom 5% of the general population 
intellectually. However, the bottom 5% of the general population 
are not necessarily IH, so the 6.4% figure may in reality be too 
high. 
In accepting the results of any of the above surveys, a note of 
warning must be sounded. Much will depend on how the penal or 
correctional institutions were selected, how IQ was tested and 
what level of IQ was selected as the cut-off point between retarded 
and non-retarded. 
Furthermore, to take such findings as truly indicative of the 
incidence of criminality among the IH is to assume that the 
incarcerated population is a representative sample of the criminal 
population and that intellectual handicap is not a factor in the 
decision to incarcerate in itself. In fact, the IH offender 
is more likely to be apprehended, more likely to confess and 
more likely to be convicted than would be an offender of average 
intelligence. 
It ls, however, accepted that a disproportionate number of IH 
people, compared with the general population, commit crimes. 35 
27. 
C. Types of Offences Commonly Committed by Intellectually 
Handic~pped Offenders 
Brown and Courtless in their study also reported on the types 
of crimes committed by IH inmates. Of those identified as IH, 
a sample of 1000 inmates was selected with measured . IQ 's below 
fiftyfive. These amount, however, to only 1.6% of the 10% of 
the prison population identified as IH. Further, the survey 
did not cover jails and workhouses where misdemeanants and minor 
offenders were confined. 
Of the 1000 inmates selected, it was found that 28% had been 
committed on conviction of breaking and entering and burglary. 
Thls corresponded closely to the figure cited by the United States 
Bureau of Prisons for the total prison population. However,, 
57% of those inmates with an IQ below fiftyfive had been convicted 
of crimes against the person, including homicide, assault and 
sexual offences. Prison statistics indicated that of the total 
population confined to adult institutions, approximately 27% 
had been committed on the basis of these personal offences. The 
percentage of those convicted of homicide (15.4%) was three times 
as high as that of the total prison population. 
In light of the qualifications which introduced these findings, 
the data should not be misconstrued as indicating positively that 
most IH offenders commit serious crimes against the person. 
Most other sources indicate that offences of an impulsive or petty 
nature, which do not require careful planning or execution, 
preponderate among the IH anti-social population. Even amongst 
these sources, however, there is some disagreement. 
---------------
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Hayes and Hayes state that . the offences most frequently committed 
36 by IH people are breaking and entering and burglary. 
According to Heaton- Ward, the offences committed by the 
moderately retarded person are usually minor, such as petty 
thieving, including the shoplifting of articles of little value. 
Some may commit acts of arson or be used by others of higher 
intelligence to commit more serious thefts on their behalf. He 
notes that crimes of violence are rare among the IH, but adds that 
there is some evidence that parents of battered babies are 
. l l"k l t b f b l · . t 11· 37 excessive y 1 e y o e o su norma 1n e 1gence. 
Gunzburg, on the otherhand, sees the problem of sex delinquency as 
38 a real one. This, he says, "does not originate in the 
subnormal' s excessive sexual urges, but is the result of a faulty 
canalization of normal sex drives. 1139 He distinguishes sex 
crimes from immorality. In the former category, involving 
offences which contain violence or a threat of viblence, or are 
committed against people who cannot give legal consent, sexual 
assaults on children are common. He considers that such offences 
are not those of a sexual maniac, but rather, are a form of 
sexual exploration found frequently among adolescents. They are 
perhaps due to the IH person's poor judgment, lack of social and 
moral insight and lack of social experience. 
As regards the IH person's immorality, Gunzburg further 
distinguishes between men and women. The offences most frequently 
committed by men are of a homosexual nature. Although he himself 
is not an active homosexual, the IH male will often be the victim of 
homosexual advances. He sees the case of "the immoral female 
subnormal swelling the ranks of the casual and professional 
-------------
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pr o s t i t u t e s [a s] 
• 11 40 far more serious. He ascribes this 
gliding into "the deceptively attractive life of immorality"to 
inadequate standards of the parental home and the powerful 
drive to snatch at a little love and affection. 
D. Formulating the Appropriate Method of Dealing with 
Intellectually Handicapped Offenders 
Without wishing to encroach excessively on the later examination 
of how the criminal justice system does and should deal with IH 
offenders, the points discussed in the foregoing sections anticipate 
the question of the extent to which intellectual handicap should be 
legally relevant to criminal responsibility. A distinction must 
be drawn here between those IH people who know what they are doing 
in committing an offence, and those who offend totally in a world 
of their own, unsuspecting of the consequences of their actions. 
To a certain extent, this distinction depends on the degree of 
retardation and also on the nature of the offence committed. 
It is the firm view of the NZSIH that most IH people know when they 
are doing something wrong and that punishment should be meted out 
accordingly. Release from responsibility is not warranted by the 
mere fact of intellectual handicap. On the contrary, this could 
result in an - expectation by some IH people that various types 
of anti-social or criminal behaviour are acceptable. It could 
also result in an expectation that they will not be punished for 
behaviour which they realise is unacceptable. 
--
at 
---
--
30. 
Whilst it will not always be · possible to teach IH people appropriate 
behaviour and sense of responsibility prior to the commission of the 
act, they must be taught if possible to learn from fueir errors. 
The objectives in such cases will match some of those underlying the 
criminal justice system's treatment of the average offender: 
individual and perhaps general deterrence and making the offender 
understand and accept that the behaviour was wrong and that it 
entails personal liability. 
There are problems, however, in achieving these objectives in the 
case of an IH offender. To be effective, the punishment must be 
related, in the offender's mind, to the offending behaviour. 
Punishment received without being understood may further lead to 
fear, resentment and non-co-operation. In some IH people, it may 
strengthen an underlying belief that society is against them. 
These considerations can apply to any offender, but they are 
especially relevant in respect of IH offenders given their substandard 
intellectual development and personal and social deficiencies. 
That a sentence of imprisonment may achieve society's objectives in the 
case of some IH offenders is not disputed. But in many other cases, the 
prejudicial e ffects of a prison sentence will outweigh its 
presumed value to both society and the individual. Gunzburg, while 
acknowledging the value of strict discipline in some cases, states 
that "in the majority it is rather like using a sledge-hammer to 
crack a nut - and the scars left by this process may do irreparable 
damage to the subnormal 's mental development . 1141 In the same vein, 
it has been said that "giving a retarded person a criminal record 
is not necessarily the best way to teach him social responsibilit) ' • 1142 
The social responsiblity may be instilled and the punishment best 
administered in the context of the person's familiar surroundings by 
------m 
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family, friends or NZSIH staff. 
So while the objectives to be achieved will generally remain constant, 
their implementation should depend on the individual IH offender 
concerned. It will also necessarily depend on the nature and 
seriousness of the offenee committed~ a need for public protection 
·H,e. need 
and to satisfy the public's possible sense of outrage. 
/1. 
The other class of IH offenders, in terms of the distinction 
drawn at the beginning of this section, poses greater problems in 
the administration of the criminal law and criminal justice. These 
are people who really do not have much idea of what they are doing, 
let alone of the consequences of their actions. Can such people 
properly be held responsible for their actions and subjected to 
the criminal law in its present state? Should the tests of 
criminal responsibility be made more subjective to cater for the IH? 
Perhaps the first questionis what society is hoping to achieve in 
rendering such offenders culpable. The first objective must be to 
show the offender and others that certain types of behaviour are not 
acceptable~ that the offender has transgressed the limits of 
acceptable behaviour. Secondly, the offender is to be instilled 
with an improved sense of social responsibility such that he or she 
accepts accountability for the consequences of his or her actions which 
detrimentally affect others. Thirdly, society renders an offender 
culpable to enable punishment to take place. 
The second question therefore is what society is hoping to achieve 
in punishing such offenders. Punishment should aim at reducing 
the likelihood of the offence being repeated by the offender or by 
others, inducing everybody to respect and abide by the law, protecting 
-----------
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other people and their property. Punishment should further the 
process of instilling social responsibility initiated by holding 
the offender responsible for his or her criminal behaviour. 
The punishment imposed should be no greater than is necessary to 
achieve its objectives, and should be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender. 
On occasions, however~ a public need for protection and a need to 
satisfy the public's sense of outrage at the serious consequences 
of an offence may override these limitations. 
Implementing the aims of society in attaching responsibility to 
certain acts and punishing the actors has special problems in the 
case of IH offenders who really know nothing of the nature and 
consequences of their behaviour. Indeed, where the offence 
committed by such an IH person is not serious or, even if serious, 
will not be repeated, it is difficult to see that punishment serves 
any purpose. There is no need for public protection. Other potential 
offenders are not likely to take as universally applicable the example 
set by non-punishment in such an extreme case. Nor will any benefits 
to the offender, in terms of understanding why the behaviour was 
wrong, accepting social responsibility, and future deterrence, flow 
from the punishment. 
Where there is a need for public protection, or where some form 
of punishment would benefit the individual, then it should be imposed. 
As with the first class of IH offenders, the method of punishment 
should depend on the individual involved and on the nature and 
seriousness of the offence. 
,, ' 
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Relating the concept of punishment to that of culpability, it would 
seem unfair to apply a set of laws based on normality to people who 
have no conception of what is normal and that what they were doing is 
wrong. The criminal law reflects this to a certain extent. It 
allows the person, where appropriate, to set up defences of lack of 
mens rea, recklessness, insanity and so on, thermy negating 
responsibility for the criminal act. 43 But it is an either/or 
situation: the IH person who cannot satisfy the legal criteria for 
these defences is necessarily responsible for the crime. 
The solution to this problem is not necessarily to modify the criminal 
law. Loosening up the current tests of criminal responsibility 
in respect of this group of offenders would make it difficult to 
disallow similar modifications in respect of other groups who could 
prove that the normal standards of responsibility are too high. 
A similar argument would discredit the setting up of a special 
defence of 11·intellectual handicap". Moreover, such a defence could 
be likely to be abused by those IH offenders who should pnoperly be 
held responsible and punished in the same manner as other offenders. 
The solution to the problems of responsibility and punishability 
must, where the normal standards of the criminal law are to be 
applied to such IH offenders, rest within the discretion of the 
sentencing judge. The discretion in sentencing is wide enough to 
enable a judge to weigh up all competing factors, including 
intellectual handicap, in determining the most just and effective 
way of dealing with the offender. 
Leaving the ~atter in the hands of the judiciary rests, however, 
on one important presumption. This is that judges will recognise 
the offender as IH and will have sufficient knowledge of 
34. 
intelle c tu a l ha ndicap to be able to properly exercise their 
discretion. This in turn depends partly on whether lawyers and 
others involved in the court proceedings will be able to offer 
the necessary assistance in the matter. As shall be seen in 
Par:t V, the presumption is not irrebuttable. 
-
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PART IV. FIRST CO~lTACT WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
THE POLICE. 
As the first and perhaps last point of contact between any offender and 
the criminal justice system, the police are in a position of 
enormous responsibility. In the case of the IH offender, given 
the prevalence of ignorant and prejudiced attitudes amon~tl the 
public to IH people, this responsibility is further increased by 
the fact that the police officer is "the front-line person who is 
first to mediate between the retarded person and the public •1144 
In assessing how well this responsibility is discharged and in 
looking at the legal and practical framework within which the New 
Zealand Police operate when dealing with an IH offender, the first 
point to note is that the police receive no formal education in 
intellectual handicap and its associated problems in the course of 
their training. 45 This may, and in fact does sometimes, impede 
them in dealing with IH offenders appropriately. 
Initially, the problem is one of recognition. When asked whether 
IH people have been reported or have otherwise come to their attention 
because of alleged criminal or antisocial behaviour, many members 
of the police force assert that they have "never met one." In some 
cases this may well be true. In others, however, subsequent 
comments (such as references to IH people being 'round the twist') 
indicate that some members of the police do not know what to loo~ 
for anyway, and highlight the fact that they share in general 
public attitudes towards the IH.
46 In the case of the police, 
unlike that of the public at large, this lack of knowledge and 
awareness of intellectual handicap amounts really to a professional 
inadequacy. To properly carry out their powers and duties where 
-
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an IH person is concerned, the police should be able to recognise 
intellectual handicap, make an informed judgment as to its 
relevance to the conduct in question and know how to deal with 
such a person. 
A. Police Powers and Action in respect of Intellectually 
Handicapped Offenders - the Statutory Background and 
the General Instructions 
In theory, the police's powers and duties in respect of IH offenders 
or suspected offenders are the same as their powers and duties in 
respect of other offenders. The legislation (with the exception 
of the Mental Health Act 1969) and the Police General Instructions 
pursuant to which the police are required to operate make no 
distinction between IH and non-IH people) the IH as a group rate 
. f. t. 47 no speci ic men ion. 
But the fact that the distinction is not drawn is not of itself 
conclusive. More important is what the legislation and guidelines 
leave unmentioned, those areas left purposely nebulous. Thus the 
police are under no legal duty to investigate complaints from the 
public, nor to arrest a suspect (unless a warrant is in existence), 
nor even to prosecute f-0r an offence. The decision in all these 
matters turns on the exercise of a wide discretion which, where not 
48 49 
express.ly conferred, can be implied from the silence of the law. 
The General Instructions provide some guidelines at the policy l~vel 
as to how the discretion in such matters is to be exercised. Whilst 
police action contrary to the General Instructions would not result 
in legal liability, it would in most cases be frowned upon and may 
lead to departmental sanctions. 
-
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The effect of the General Instructions on the manner in which the 
police decide to act can be seen by following through the alternatives 
available to them in dealing with an IH person suspected of or found 
offending. 
Assume a police officer finds an IH person committing an offence 
punishable by imprisonment, for example, theft. A range of options 
as to what action to take is available to the officer, the extent 
of which will depend upon the seriousness of the offence, the 
wishes of the victim, the approach and attitude of the offender, the 
circumstances in which the offence was committed, and so on. Thus 
the I~ person may be cautioned, spoken to, ordered to return the 
property, sent back to his or her family or IHC, summonsed or 
arrested. But essentially, in terms of the General Instructions, 
the options open to the officer are either to arrest or not to arrest. 
On the question of arrest without warrant, the General Instructions 
merely state that the power to do so is at all times to be exercised 
with discretion, and that all arrests should be made for good and 
sufficient reasons in accordance with established policy. There is 
no need to arrest if the offence is a minor one committed by an 
otherwise respectable citizen who can be brought before the court 
50 on summons. 
An arrest may be effected pursuant to the authority conferred by 
s.315(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 and the IH person may be taken into 
police custody for questioning. 
Section 316(1) of the Crimes Act imposes a duty on the arresting 
officer to inform the person being arrested, at the time of the 
arrest, of the act or omission for which he or she is being arrested. 
The duty need not be complied with if it would be impracticable to 
--------
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do so or if the reason for the arrest is obvious in the 
circumstances. The act or omission may be stated in any words 
sufficient to give the arrested person notice of the true reason 
for his arrest. 
Similarly, the General Instructions state that an arrested person 
should not be left imdoubt as to the nature of the charge against 
him. There is a duty to tell the prisoner of the nature of the charge, 
unless the circumstances are such that the prisoner must know the 
1 f th ff f h . h h . d t . d 
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genera nature o e o ence or w ic e is e aine • 
Where IH people are arrested for an offence, it is arguable that 
the duty under s.316(1) may be breached 
52 in some cases. Although 
the full import of the legal concept is not required, the wording of 
s.316(1) is such that the duty will not be satisfied merely by the 
arresting officer stating the reasons for the arrest; the words 
used have to be sufficient to give that person knowledge of the 
reasons. That any choice of words and any amount of explanation will 
get the message across to some IH people is not guaranteed. 
The subjectivity of s.316(1) is supported by the fact that the duty 
need not be complied with if "the reason for the arrest is obvious 
in the circumstances." Obvious to whom? The IH person or the 
arresting officer? It is submi~ed that it is the former. Note that 
if the person is more severely retarded, it may be impracticable to 
inform him or her of the reasons for the arrest, in which case the 
duty need not be complied with. Much will depend on whether the 
arresting officer recognises the fact of retardation and on the 
degree of retardation. 
39. 
The alternative view, that s.316(1) requires only a reasonable 
objective compliance, while facilitating the work of police 
officers, cannot be supported by the clear words of the subsection. 
The fact that an IH person may not understand the reasons for the 
arrest may in some cases influence the officer in a decision to 
arrest. He or she may see this as the only possible course of 
action for the person's protection. 
The General Instructions do not indicate what is to happen where an 
arrest is not made. Since in New Zealand there is no power of 
detention short of arrest,
53 
the IH person is free to go as he or 
she wishes. However, the desire to please of _many IH people and 
their respect for figures of authority may mean that they will not 
refuse a request by the officer to accompany him or her to the police 
station. In fact most"normal· people will be likely to accompany l1 
the officer in such cases, and many will believe that they are under 
arrest. At the station., the result of enquiries made may reveal 
the most suitable course of action - either an arrest at this later 
stage, a severe warning or cautioning, or release possibly to a 
community agency such as IHC. 
Once the decision has been made to arrest the IH person and take him 
or her into police custody, how the person then remains to be dealt 
w i t h w i 11 d e p e n d on t h e ex er c i s e of t he po l i c e ' s pr o s e c u t ov- i al 
discretion. 
This discretion has no statutory basis but the General Instructions 
are clear on the question of its existence, at least in respect of 
minor offences.
54 They state that the question that should be 
uppermost in the mind of the police officer when deciding to prosecute 
• -
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a minor offence is whether an arrest or prosecution is the best 
way of resolving a particular incident. There may be some 
alternative more suited to the occasion, for example, a warning, 
a caution, counselling or referral to a more appropriate agency. 
Consultation with National Headquarters on whether to exercise the 
discretion not to prosecute in unusual cases is ex-.c.ou<~5e.J • 
Through the exercise of the discretion and through referral to 
other agencies not directly involved in law enforcement, some IH 
offenders ~ay be dealt with in the most appropriate manner without 
being given a criminal record. For example, they can be taught 
where they went wrong and made to understand this and accept 
responsibility by IHC. 
In the absence of a set policy in the realm of the discretion to 
prosecute, the decision will be based on a number of considerations. 
The General Instructions implicitly recognise the validity of any 
factor warranting an alternative resolution of the particular 
incident • 
The more obvious factors are the nature and seriousness of the 
alleged offence, the culpability and circumstances of the prospective 
defendant, whether he or she has an unblemished record and whether 
the person has previously been let off with a warning in respect of 
similar incidents. Recognition of intellectual handicap could be 
an important factor. It could be relevant to the prosecution's 
chances of success and also to whether the police decide that a 
prosecution is the best way of resolving the case, given the 
availability of other more appropriate means. Where the arrest was 
made following a complaint from a member of the public, the police 
------------m 
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may be more reluctant not to prosecute as the complainant would 
have to be advised of the reasons for the decision. How the 
complainant would r e ceive such notification may thus be an 
additional factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion, 
for the police are also acting in such situations as mediators 
between the IH person and the public. 
B. Police Powers and Action in Respect of Intellectually 
Handicapped Offenders - The Practice.
55 
The NZSIH, both at National Office and at branch level, report 
that police action in respect of IH offenders or suspected offenders 
is generally satisfactory. This means that although there is the 
initial problem nf identification of intellectual handicap, once 
identified, the police are usually willing to take it into account 
in deciding how the IH person is best dealt with. So in practice, 
exercise of both the arrest and prosecutoria.l discretions may be 
based on the presence of intellectual handicap in the offender. 
Police action where an offender is ·kn own to be or is suspected of 
being IH is usually to contact IHC and ex plain the situation to 
' 
them. 56 The police and IHC then discuss the most pref er able 
course of action, that is, whether IHC should take the matter into 
their hands or whether the police should proceed with an arrest or 
prosecution. The decision will be based on the nature and 
seriousness of the offence, whether there is a public need to see 
justice being done, whether the offender has previously been left 
in the hands of IHC following offences in the past, whether IHC can 
deal effectively with the offender, whether a prosecution would in 
fact achieve anything. IHC have reportedly persuaded the police to 
prosecute in some cases where they believed that this was the only way 
the IH person could be punished and taught responsibility. Ultimately 
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the decision rests with the police. 
The police seem generally keen to keep IH people out of court and out 
of the criminal justice system.
57 
An IHC Social Worker recalled 
several incidents which could have resulted in a court case, such as 
older IH males "annoying" young school children (which could be 
misinterpreted by society), setting off burglar alarms, trespassing, 
small thefts, - cases where the IH person does not realise that the 
behaviour is wrong or unacceptable, where the IH person is really 
the victim of his or her personal and social inadequacies rather 
than an active offender. In all these cases the police allegedly 
made an effort to talk to the offending person and to make him or 
her understand and accept the wrongfulness of the behaviour. 
Evidence gathered from police at senior level and from officers 
on the street would seem to support the NZSIH views. The friendly 
"community relations" approach advocated and implemented by many 
officers in.their dealin~ with the public would no doubt achieve a 
great deal in the case of an IH person suspected of or found offending. 
Many IH people respond badly to harsh expressions, cues and 
treatment, while at the same time looking up to figures of authority • 
They will be much more co-operative with and receptive to police who 
adopt a friendly approach. 
Senior police staff, however, adverted to the fact that the police 
force consists largely of young officers many of whom do not exercise 
sufficient discretion in deciding whether to arrest. Either ~ey do not 
always know when to use the discretion or they do not know how much 
discretion to use when faced with a situation which could justify an 
arrest. So whether they recognise a person as IH or not, officer ,; 
-----
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may not take intellectual handicap into account. If a part of the 
police training programme were devoted to the IH as a special group, 
this may result in a greater use of discretion by younger officers when 
dealing with the IH. 
While appearing to be wide in theory, in practice the prosecutortol 
discretion is more limited. Many of the factors relevant to the 
exercise of the discretion will already have been considered in 
deciding whether or not to arrest the person. It is rare for the 
police toidecide against prosecution once an arrest has been made. 
Where the decision is made not to prosecute an IH offender, this 
may be partly due to the fact that he or she was not recognised as 
IH until after an arrest was made. 
Apart from the nature and seriousness of the offence, two other main 
factors appear to be important in the exercise of the prosecutodal 
discretion. The first is recognition of intellectual handicap. This 
goes largely to whether the police believe that a prosecution would 
be successful. Because the IH person may not have known what he or 
she was doing, the 'guilty mind' required by ~ost offences will have 
been absent. But - and perhaps somewhat surprisingly - the primary 
significance that the police would seem to attach to intellectual 
handicap is that the person will not be fit to stand trial. He or 
she will be found to be 'under disability' in tterms of s.39C of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1954. 
The second factor is that IHC exists as an alternative and possibly 
more appropriate agency to deal with the incident. 
44. 
The exercise of this discretion is a difficult matter for 
the police and in a sense IHC are to blame for this by placing the 
police in a position of uncertainty. Whereas at times they are asking 
the police to show understanding or leniency by taking the fact of 
intellectual handicap into account, at others, in accordance with 
the principle of normalisation, IHC are asking the pblice to treat 
the offender as they would any other offender and to take action 
accordingly. This results in a perpetuation of the consultative 
process referred to above. 
A decision not to prosecute is in practice always accompanied by a 
warning to the IH offender. This is seen as important, since although 
the wrongfulness of the person's actions will be fully brought home 
to him or her, if possible, by IHC (if referral to IHC is a part of 
the de c i s i on n o t t o pr o sec u t e ) , a po 1 ice war n i n g i s l i k e 1 y t o have 
a greater and more lasting effect in most cases as coming from an 
outsider in a position of authority. 
C. Police Qu e stioning of Intell e ctually Handicapped Suspe cts 
Police questioning of persons in custody in relation to an alleged 
58 offence is governed in New Zealand by the 1930 English Judges Rules 
and Administrative Directions to the Police, first formulated and 
approved by the Judges of the King's Bench Division in 1912 and 1918. 
The Rules do not have the force of law, but are applicable in New 
Zealand as guidelines to the police on the proper course of actio1. to 
be taken in the various stages of . . . 59 an investigation. The Rules are 
not to be construed strictly, but rather their spirit is to be 
observed. The spirit of the Rules is such that any evidence obtained 
unfairly or improperly from the person questioned may be excluded 
froM subsequent court proceedings at the judge's discretion. 
.. , 
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Thus persons in custody whom . the police have decided to,charge 
with an offence must first be cautioned as to their right to 
silence, before questioning proceeds. The caution is couched in
 
these terms: "Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charg
e? 
You are not obliged tn-say anything unless you wish to do so, but 
whatever you say may be taken down in writing and given in eviden
ce." 
The same caution should be administered where the prisoner wishes 
to volunteer any statement. 
The police are not entitled to cross examine the 
improperly in respect of a voluntary statement; 
only for the purpose of removing ambiguity. 
prisoner 
they may question 
Any statement made in accordance with the Rules should be taken 
down in writing and signed by the person making it after it has be
en 
read to him and he has been invited to make any corrections to it.
 
There is a clear possibility that the police may be acting 
improperly or unfairly, in breach of the Rules, when questioning 
an IH person. The breaches may be inadvertent, but may also be 
deliberate given that the Rules are often inconsistent with good 
police practice. For example, the police may have to cross-examin
e 
an IH prisoner "imprcperly" in respect of his or her voluntary 
statement simply in order to obtain a clear and logical picture of
 
the facts. Such questioning may, however, be justified in some ca
ses 
on the basis that it was directed to removing ambuguity. 
Many IH prisoners will be unlikely to understand the caution 
administered before questioning or before the taking of a voluntar
y 
statement, especially if the formal terms of the caution are not 
elaborated on. The fairness of evidence having been obtained from
 
-
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an IH person who is unaware of the right to silence, unaware of 
the effect of his or her statements and likely to make admissions 
he or she neither intends nor understands may well be in issue in 
subsequent court proceedings. Although a technical breach of the 
Rules will probably not be established, a disregard of their spirit 
usually will be, with the consequence that the trial judge may in 
his discretion refuse to admit the statement thus obtained. 
In 1978, the Home Office issued ~dministrative Direction 4A to the 
English police. 60 It directed them to take particular care in 
putting questions to and accepting the reliability of answers from 
a person who appears to be mentally handicapped and possibly unable to 
understand questions and open to suggestion. As far as practicable, 
and where recognised as such by the police, a mentally handicapped 
adult should be interviewed only in the presence of a parent or 
person in whose custody, care and control he is, or any other person 
with a professional interest in the mentally handicapped. 
This direction is not in force fu-New Zealand. However, in practice 
it seems that a person in custody identified as IH is seldom refused 
a request to have a relative, friend of IHC staff member present 
during questioning. This of course depends on the timing of the 
request, the nature of the offence and whether the police identify 
the person as IH. The question of recognition is obviously crucial. 
~ ~ ~ 
Where the person is so identified, it appears that the initiative to 
have another person present during questioning is taken by the police. 
The Judges' Rules do not affect the principle that any statement 
made or answer given to a question put by a police officer must 
have been voluntary if it is to be admitted in evidence. 
-----• ------
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In the New Zealand case of Naniseni v. The Queen,
61 the 
voluntariness of the accused's confession was challenged. Turner J. 
in the Court of Appeal revie'foled the New Zealand and overseas 
authorities to settle the meaning of 'voluntary'. Relying heavily 
on the wording of s.20 of the Evidence Act 1908, he concluded that 
'voluntary' 
62 
• •• must be taken to signify that the will of the person 
making the confession has not been overborne. If the 
factor which is set up as rendering the confession not 
voluntary is something in the nature of threats, violence, 
• 
force or other form of compulsion ••• or ••• duress, 
intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or 
undue influence or pressure~ whatever is alleged as 
an inducement must have been brought to bear on the 
prisoner by some other person, and to have influenced 
him to make the confession. If what is set up is the 
more special ground of "some fear of prejudice or hope 
or advantage exercised or held out to or upon him", 
not only must the inducement be held out by some other 
person but that other person must be shown to be a 
person in authority over him. 
The voluntariness of an IH person's statements may well be impeachable 
in subsequent proceedings. The prosecution will bear the burden 
of affirmatively proving their voluntary nature.
63 
Any of the factors mentioned by Turner J. in the passage cited may 
have been present to overbear the IH person's will, in particular, 
intimidation, or some fear of prejudice or hope of advantage. However, 
the prosecution may successfully argue that the person's will was not 
in fact overborne by that of the police officer. As Turner J. 
stated, "the will of some other person is essential; 
-----------------• -
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the involuntariness cannot be produced from within.
1164 The 
argument would be that the intimidation, duress, fear of prejudice 
or hope of advant a ge , etc. are th e product sol e ly of the IH 
pe~son's particular mental and emotional processes, rather than 
having been 'held out• by the police officer. 
Although the Naniseni Court was not directly concerned with s.20 
of the Evidence Act, that section must clearly be applied wherever 
applicable. It provides that: 
A confession tendered in evidence in any criminal 
proceeding shall not be rejected on the ground that a 
promise or threat or any other inducement (not being 
the exercise of violence or force or other form of 
compulsion) has been held out to or exercised upon the 
per s on c on f e s s i n g , if the J u d g e or o t h er pr e s i di n g 
officer is satisfied that the means by which the 
confession was obtained were not in fact likely to 
cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made. 
It has been shown in the United States that IH suspects are more 
likely to confess than others.
65 The reasons for this may be the 
IH person's poor judgment, impressionability, desire to please, 
confusion, fear and, of course, low intelligence. 
-
One problem in applying s.20 to confessions obtained from IH 
suspects is that in the majority of cases, the admission of guilt 
will, as has been said, result not from direct or indirect means 
actively employed by the police officer, but rather from the 
person's own reactions to the entire situation. 
.. ' 
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Even if 'means' were employed, were these in fact likely to cause 
an untrue admission of guilt to re made? 
The test to be applied in determiniog the likelihood of untruth 
under s.20 was enunciated by the Supreme Court in R. v. Hammond: 
••• the test ••• is whether or not an innocent person 
in the position of the accused and in the circumstances 
in which he was placed would be likely to confess to a 
crime which he had not committed ••• [J=]or this purpose, 
the Judge is not entitled to have regard to any view which 
he may have formed as to whether the admission actually 
66 
made was true but must restrict himself to the consideration 
of the tendency or otherwise of the accused, assuming him 
to be innocent, to admit guilt. 
The test must be applied subjectively, such that one must consider
 
the likelihood of an innocent IH person, of the same degree of 
retardation as the accused, confessing to the crime which he had n
ot 
committed. Many IH may respond to an inducement by admitting gui
lt, 
whether they are innocent or guilty. The tendency to admit guilt 
is 
likely to increase with the severity of the retardation such that 
the 
more retarded the accused is, the more likely he or she will be to
 
respond even to the most trivial inducement. Hence the reliabilit
y 
of the statement will be closely related to the degree of 
retardation. 
Finally, if an IH person's confession is admitted in evidence, his
 
or her counsel may still place in issue its probative value. In 
R. v. Santinon
67 the British Columbian Court of Appeal held that 
while not of itself rendering a statement involuntary and inadmis
sible, 
a person's mental condition is relevant to the weight to be attach
ed 
---------
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to the evidence. The case involved an insane person, but the 
ruling must necessarily apply also to evidence obtained from an 
IH person the reliability of whose statements is doubted. Indeed 
68 in R. v. Stewart it was found that the probative value of 
admissions made by a severely retarded defendant was far outweighed 
by their prejudicial effect. In that case, the evidence was not 
admitted at all. 
The probative value to be attached to the statement of an IH person 
will be a question of ,act and cie3'("ee.. in each case. The level of 
retardation will be the predominating factor. Other factors will 
go to the general reliability of the statement in light of all the 
circumstances in which it was made, including impropriety or 
unfairness. 
It must be remembered that in practice, a relative, friend or IHC 
staff member will be present during questioning and the taking of a 
statement. Allegations of unfairness, involuntariness and, perhaps, 
lack of probative value will therefore be difficult to sustain • 
D • Police Powers under the Mental Health Act 1969 
The only statutory provisions which confer and impose on the police 
specific powers and duties in respect of the IH are s.35 and s.36 
of the Mental Health Act 1969. 69 These pr ov i si ons extend the role 
of the police as law enforcement agents to that of agents of the 
mental health system. 
Section 35 empowers a police officer to ·make or cause to be made an 
application for a reception order for the detention of a person in 
a psychiatric hospital if he or she has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person 
• • ---• ----• • • • 
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a) is mentally disordered, and 
b) is neglected or cruelly treated by any person having the 
care or charge of him or her, or is suicidal or dangerous, or is 
not under proper oversight, care or control. 
The power is exercisable if an application for a reception order 
appears to be for the person's good or in the public interest. If 
necessary, the officer may apprehend any such person found wandering 
at large and bring him or her before a District Court Judge • 
Under s.36, any District Court Judge to whom an application has 
been made for a reception order in respect of any mentally disordered 
person may issue a warrant for the arrest of that person and require any 
member of the police to apprehend the person and bring him or her 
before a District Court Judge. 
70 
A full discussion of these provisions is not proposed. The duty 
that may arise by virtue of s.36 entails only the carrying out of 
a judicial order. While the power conferred by s.35 raises certain 
issues, such as the inherent unsuitability of the police to act in 
respect of mentally disordered persons and the breadth of the grounds 
for exercise of the power, it is rarely invoked in respect of IH 
people. The usual course of action where a police officer comes 
across an IH person in c i rcumstances that would warrant exercise 
of the power is to contact the person's family or IHC.
71 
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PART V. 
5 2. 
INTELLECTUAL HANDICAP AS A FACTOR IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE COURT DISPOSITION 
OF I~TELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED DEFENDANTS 
An affirmative exercise of the police's prosecutori~ discretion 
necessarily results in the initiation of court proceedings. At this 
stage, the presence of intellectual handicaprin a defendant and 
the recognition accorded such by key criminal justice personnel -
police prosecutors, lawyers and judges - can play an important part 
in the determination of his or her fate. This may be so without 
guilt or innocence of the alleged crime even becoming an issue. 
A lack of awareness of intellectual handicap is often reflected 
throughout the cuurt process by the criminal justice personnel 
involved. If and once recognised as IH, attitudes to the defendant 
may vary fro~ insensitivity through to patronisation and assumptions 
of incapacity on the one hand, to assumptions of inherent criminality 
on the other. Informed and understanding attitudes may, of course, 
figure in between these extremes • 
Education in this area would greatly facilitate the task of defence 
72 counsel and judge. A general knowledge of intellectual handicap 
and specific knowledge of the possible related legal issues and 
the approaches to dealing with the IH in court could appropriately 
be incorporated into undergraduate law study or be made the subject 
of seminars, perhaps of the "continuing education" type sometimes 
organised by the New Zealand Law Society. The point of such education 
would be not only to enable recognition of intellectual handicap, 
but also to assist counsel in preparing the client's case (deciding 
which factors to emphasise and which, if any, defences would be 
viable) and the court in disposing of the defendant appropriately 
-------
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(for example,it may find the . defendant's handicap to have negated 
any intention to commit the crime or it may consider it an important 
factor in deciding which sentence to impose). It is to be hoped that 
it would result in counsel and judges being more reluctant to 
invoke the provisions of Part VA of the Criminal Justice Act 1954 
concerning mentally disordered persons. 
Credit must be given to IHC and their efforts to counter the effects 
of this current lack of education. Where a defendant is known to 
IHC, it is not infrequent for them to play an active part before and 
during the court proceedings. Thus an IHC staff member (usually a 
social worker) may brief defence counsel on the particular 
circumstances of the IH defendant, the relevance of his or her 
handicap to the ~lleged offence and may suggest to counsel the most 
appropriate disposition to be presented to the court. In court, he 
or she may act as a mouthpiece for the IH defendant with particularly 
poor communication skills. In his or her capacity as a person with 
experience or expert knowledge in intellectual handicap, the IHC 
staff me~ber may be called upon by the judge to give evidence on 
any matters relating to intellectual handicap in general or to the 
particular defendant. Finally, he or she will be there to give the 
IH defendant the possibly needed moral support in unfamiliar court 
d . 
73 
surroun ings. 
While, with respect to IHC, there may be possible dangers of abuse 
in its apparent power to influence the course of prosecution (such 
as legally innocent IH people being pressured into guilty pleas),, 
its role in court proceedings must be seen as a necessary consequence 
of the uncertainties which IH defendants would appear to cause to 
c rim in a 1 justice person n e l at present • 
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Possible Court Dispositions of the Intellectually 
Handicapped Defendant 
The range of options which may be available to the judge in 
criminal proceedings involving an IH defendant is considerably 
wider than that available to the judge in respect of a non-IH 
defendant . Not only may the IH accused be found guilty or not 
guilty of the alleged crime, but also the provisions of Part VA 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1954 may be invoked such that the 
accused be diverted, either temporarily or permanently, from the 
criminal justice system to the mental health system. 
1. Not ~uilty or guilty 
The I~ defendant may be able to plead guilty or not guilty, raise 
defences and be acquitted or convicted of the offence charged in 
the same way as any other defendant. 
This section examines briefly the relevance of intellectual handicap 
to the issue of responsibility for the crime and the defences which 
the I~ accused may raise in criminal proceedings. 74 
(a) Intention 
75 In Cunliffe v. Goodman , "intention" was defined as a state of 
affairs which the party intending decides to bring about, and which 
he or she has a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about, by 
his or her own act of volition. Whether the intent required by a 
particular offence can be satisfied by proof that the accused foresaw 
or knew of the highly probable consequences of his or her actions, 76 
or by proof that the accused desired the results of his or her actions~ 7 
the main issue in the case of the IH accused is whether he or she 
has the mental capacity to form an intention. Specifically, could 
the IH person make a decision to bring about the state of affairs? 
Was it brought about by the person's own acts of volition? 
•• 
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Most IH people are only mildly or moderately retarded and would 
probably be capable of forming the required intent. 
Where an argument of lack of intention to commit the crime does 
succeed, the IH person will be acquitted. The evidence may, however, 
justify a finding of insanity and acquittal on the grounds of 
insanity, if this defence is raised. 
(b) Recklessness 
The mens rea required for certain crimes can be satisfied by proof 
of recklessness on the part of the accused. Recklessness means 
adverting to the consequences of one's acts. It is not clear in 
New Zealand whether recklessness is to be judged subjectively or 
objectively. If the former, 
78 as was held in OPP v Morgan, 
the IH person will have been reckless if he or she adverted to the 
consequences of his or her act, but committed it nevertheless, 
thereby causing injury or damage. 
a majority of the House of Lords in 
If the latter, as was held by 
79 R. v. Caldwell, the IH person 
will have been reckless if he or she did an act which in fact 
created an obvious risk, and in doing that act gave no thought to 
the possibility of there being a risk, or decided to ignore the 
consequences and run the risk. Obviously, many more IH offenders 
will be found to have had the mens rea to commit the crime when 
judged on the "reasonable person" standard of the Caldwell test. 
( C ) Negligence 
The IH ~ccused may be held to have been negligent and therefore 
criminally responsible for his or her act if, in committing it, he 
or she felt below the standard of skill and care which would have 
80 been observed by a reasonable person. Where negligence is in 
issue, the likelihood of an IH person being acquitted is slender. 
• --
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(d) \ii stake 
The IH person may have a defence to the crime charged if he or she 
can prove that the act in question was committed because of a 
mistake of fact. If the offence requires proof of a mere intent 
to commit the act, it seems that any honest mistake will suffice. 
However, if the offence requires proof of some further state of 
mind, such as knowledge, then the mistake will have to have been 
81 both honest and reasonable. For the defence to succeed, the 
mistake will have to have been such that had the facts been as the 
accused believed them to be, no offence would have been committed. 
Thus in the case of a charge of rape under s.128 of the Crimes Act 
1961, the IH person's honest and genuine belief that the woman 
consented to the act of intercourse will not afford grounds for the 
defence unless a person of normal intelligence would also have 
believed the woman to be consenting. The reasonableness of an IH 
person's belief, when judged on "normal" standards, will often be 
difficult to maintain. 
(e) Intoxication 
The intoxication of an IH accused may be relied on to negative 
any element of the mens rea required for the particular crime. It 
may also be relied on to prove that the actus reus was not voluntary. 
In R. v Kamipeli, 82 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that evidence 
of intoxication can be used to negative the mens rea required for 
any crime and that the Crown bears the burden of proving the required 
intent. This approach was supported in the Australian case of 
R. v O'Connor, 83 in which the High Court of Australia declined to 
follow the House of Lords decision in DPP v Majews~i 84 In tht.: 
latter case, considerations of public policy prevailed over 
logicality and led to the ruling that intoxication could only be 
-57. 
used to negative mens rea in .crimes of specific intent; in crimes 
of basic intent the intoxication itself constitutes the mens rea. 
The question has been expressly left open in New Zealand.
85 
Intoxication may be an important concept in the context of 
intellectual handicap, where excessive or incorrectly prescribed 
medication may result in violent or aggressive behaviour. It may 
be argued that intoxication had a greater effect on the IH defendant, 
but otherwise the IH are in the same position as the non-IH in relation 
to this defence. 
( f) Automatism 
The defence of a11tomatism may be established by proving that the act 
in question was committed involuntarily by the muscles independently 
of the mind, thereby negating criminal responsibility. 
The defence could be viably raised by the IH offender if, for example, 
he or she suffered from epilepsy 86 or cerebral palsy, or was so 
severely retarded that the mind could not be said to control the body. 
It is not clear in New Zealand whether the defence would be available 
to a person who was at fault in bringing about his or her state of 
automatism. Much will depend on the outcome of the intoxication 
disp~te. If fault is relevant, this would mean, for example, that 
the IH person who embarks on a course of conduct knowing that he or 
she suffers from epileptic fits, may be reckless or negligent if 
the conduct results in injury or damage to another. 
.. , 
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If the intellectual handicap of the defendant has not been 
considered relevant in determining guilt, it may yet become relevant 
in sentencing the guilty IH person. Its relevance in each 
particular case will depend upon a variety of factors: the nature 
and seriousness of the offence, the conduct of the IH person in 
court, the degree of handicap, the views of the particular judge 
and the sentencing alternatives available. 
2. Diversion to the mental health system 
The term 'diversion to the mental health system' refers here to 
any psychiatric intervention in the course of criminal proceedings 
which results in either the temporary or permanent transfer of the 
accused from the criminal justice system to the mental health system. 
Under the provisions of Part VA of the Criminal Justice Act 1954, 
there exist various types of psychiatric diversion: committal to a 
psychiatric hospital following a finding of disability, committal 
following a finding of insanity or the process of what is essentially 
a civil committal after conviction. Strictly speaking, "psychiatric 
diversion" implies either an attempt at a permanent solution or at 
least an attempt to manage the problem temporarily, and does not 
therefore include a remand for psychiatric observation and 
reporting. However, there are three reasons for considering the 
remand procedures to be a form of diversion to the mental health 
system. First, they constitute a psychiatric intervention in the 
course of criminalproceedings. Secondly, although the person is 
deemed to remain in the legal custody of penal or police authorities, 
in reality he or she is under the control of the psychiatric hospital 
authorities. Thirdly, the remand may provide the starting point for 
a civil or a voluntary committal to a psychiatric hospital. 
.. ' 
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This section examines the different ~eans by which an IH accused 
may be diverted to the mental health system. A discussion of the 
desirability and pot e ntial problems of such diversion is contained 
in the following section. 
(a) Diversion by means of psychiatric remand procedures 
An important diversionary tactic from both the psychiatric and 
practical poinb of view is the court's power to order that the 
person be temporarily detained in a psychiatric hospital for the 
purpose of observation of his or her mental condition. Thus 
s.39B (1) of the Criminal Justice Act provides that: 
where any person charged with any offence punishable 
by imprisonment is in custody pending a hearing or trial 
before any Court, and it appears to that Court that he may 
be under disability> or that at the time of the commission 
of the alleged offence he may have been insane within the 
meaning of s.23 of the Crimes Act 1961, the Court may, 
subject to subsection (3) of this section, make an 
order that he be removed to a hospital and be detained there 
under observation pending the hearing or trial. 
Subsection (2) provides that the same power applies in respect of 
a person convicted of an offence who is in custody pending the 
determination of his or her appeal. 
' ., . 
Subsection (3) requires the court to be satisfied, before making 
the order, that it is necessary or expedient that the person's mental 
condition be under observation in a hospital. 
60. 
Subsections (4) and (5) provide that the total period of detention 
under the initial order and extensions thereof shall not exceed 
two months. 
The court may at any time order that the person be removed from the 
hospital and returned to::custody for the purposes of the hearing or 
trial or determination of his appeal. Such order must be made 
upon receipt of the hospital Superintendent's report on the person's 
mental condition. 
Very few persons are remanded under s.39B: fourtyfour in 1979, 
sixty in 1980 and sixtytwo in 1981. Only a minimal proportion of 
these are IH: two in 1979, one in 1980, one in 1981 and none in 
1982. 87 
The primary purpose of remand under s.39B is to determine whether 
the person is under a diaability, that is, unfit to stand trial, 
or whether he or she was insane at the time of committing the alleged 
offence. 
Remand for the purpose of obtaining a psychiatric report may also 
be ordered by the court under s.47A of the Criminal Justice Act, 
in a wider variety of situations than under s.39B. The power is 
extended in respect of persons already convicted of an offence 
punishable by imprisonment. It is exercisable before or during the 
course of the trial, before sentencing or pending the determination 
of an appeal. The court must consider it expedient that a 
psychiatric report on the person's mental condition be made available 
to it. 
.. ' 
61. 
The court m,y make one of three orders. Under subsection (2)(a~ 
the court may make it a condition of a grant of bail that the 
person attend for psychiatric ou~patient treatment. It may, 
under subsection (2)(b), order that the person be committed to a 
penal institution for up to two weeks and be psychiatrically 
examined there. Under subsection (2)(c), where the court considers 
impracticable that the examination be carried out in a penal 
institution or where a report recommending further detention for 
observation is available, the court may order that the person be 
detained and examined in a psychiatric hospital for up to one 
month. Where the latter order is made, the court must order that 
the person be returned to custody for the purposes of the hearing 
or trial, sentencing or determination of the appeal once it receives 
the hospital Superintendent's report. 
Obviously many more people are remanded under s.47 A (2)(c) than 
under s.39B: 
in 1981.
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in 1982. 
283 (9 IH) in 1979, 236 (6 IH) in 1980, 268 (8IH) 
Three IH persons were remanded under s.47A(2)(c) 
The use of s.47A(2)(c) is not restricted to determining the accused's 
fitness to stand trial or sanity. It may also be used to assist the 
c..ourt in imposing an appropriate sentence in light of the person's 
mental condition. Thus the psychiatric report could indicate 
intellectual handicap as a Tactor relevant to sentencing. 
The majority of persons remanded, whether pursuant to s.39B or s.47A, 
t b tl f d t b d d . b·1·t . 
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are no su sequen y oun o e un er isa 1 1 y or insane. This 
stems fro~ the disparity between the statutory test for determining 
remandability (the court simply has to be satisfied that the person's 
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mental condition warrants observation) and the statutory tests 
for determining disability or insanity, and surely reflects an 
excessive use of these procedures. 
It is sometimes said that the courts' power to remand is no more than 
d f . l 90 a speedy metho o committa • Strictly speaking, this cannot be 
so in view of the statutory time limit of two months. However, 
use of the remand procedure, may provide the starting point for a 
civil or voluntary committal to a psychiatric hospital. Indeed, 
under s.42(4) of the Mental Health Act 1969 there is a procedure 
whereby any person detained in a penal institution on remand 
pending trial may be the subject of an application for a temporary 
reception order. Only one IH person has been detained as a special 
patient pursuant to s.42(4) since 1979. An average of twenty 
patients in total were detained under the subsection each year from 
1979 to 1980. Further, a recent New Zealand study has indicated 
that where the psychiatric report does indicate a disability, such 
that the person is unfit to plead, there would seem to be an 
expectation that the prosecution will be withdrawn or the case 
dismrnssed and the matter settled informally out of court, perhaps 
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by a civil or a voluntary committal. 
In 1983 the Donaldson Commission of Inquiry stated in its Report 
that it considered s.39B and in fact most of the provisions of Part VA 
92 
of the Criminal Justice Act to be generally adequate. H·owever, 
both the 1981 Working Party on Psychiatrically Distuobed Prisoners 
and Remandees and the members of the 1983 Committee of Inquiry into 
Procedures at Oakley Hospital and Related Matters
93 criticised the 
Act's remand provisions and especially those enabling the detention 
of remandees in psychiatric hospitals. The Working Party in fact 
recommended that s.39B be repealed and that all assessments take 
place under s.47A.94 
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Their critic~sms were based largely on the fact that most of the 
persons remanded by the courts have not been found guilty and that 
for a considerable number of those remanded for sentence there is 
no certainty that they will receive a custodial sentence. They 
condemned the deprivation of liberty by detention in either a priso~ 
or a psychiatric hospital without a careful consideration of the 
necessity for such a move. 
The me~bers of the Oakley Inquiry also remarked that the conditions 
in which the remandees were detained and examined were such as to 
accentuate some psychiatric problems and mental disturbances and 
to deprive any observation carried out of at least some of its 
validity. They further stated that "to keep (£,er sons on re man~ 
under circumstances such as these where they are expected to associate 
with persons of the kind described is, in our opinion, a practice 
which cannot be sustained and should not continue •
1195 
These criticisms bear special force in the case of IH remandees, 
who may be particularly susceptible to harsh treatment and abnormal 
surroundings, and are likely to be greatly affected by other people 
with whom they associate. 
The Working Party recommended that persons should not be remanded 
to psychiatric hospitals for observation unless there is no 
alternative or there are very special circumstances which require 
this. The members of the Oakley Inquiry recommended similarly, 
adding that a separate remand unit be made available where remand to 
a psychiatric hospital is necessary. 
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While the Working Party, the Donaldson and Oakley Inquiry members 
and the Task Force on Revision of Mental Health Legislation made 
a number of other worthwhile recommendations in respect of the 
remand provisions of the Criminal Justic e Act, a discussion of 
these is outside the scope of the present study. Attention has 
been briefly focused only on those seen as bearing particular 
relevance to the IH. 
( b ) Diversion by means of a finding of disability 
A dissenting judge in an American case where the accused was found 
unfit to stand trial was reported as saying that "the decision 
1 i c e n s e s e v e r y i 11 i t e r a t e ;n or on t o v ial at e t h e 1 a w w i t h i m pu n i t y • " 9 6 
Not only is the statement an example of the lack of agreement in 
legal and judicial circles in respect of the handling of IH offenders, 
but also it fails to catch the full import of a finding of disability, 
namely, indefinite psychiatric detention, with all the serious 
potential problems attaching to it. 
Because it is considered important in our system of justice that 
an accused be able to participate in his or her own trial, the law 
requires that the person be mentally fit to stand trial. To borrow 
t he w or d i n g of t he L a w R e f or m C o mm i s s i on of C a n ad a , " t h e pu r pose of 
the fitness rule is to promote fairness to the accused by protecting 
his right to defend himself and by ensuring that he is an appropriate 
subject for criminal proceedings. 1197 
The rule is embodied in s.39A(lA) and s.39C of the Criminal Justice 
Act, with the traditional phrase "unfit to stand trial" replaced 
by "under disability." In defining when a per.son is under disability, 
s • 3 9 A ( l A ) large l y re pr o du c e s t he C o mm on L a w f i t n e s s c r i t er i a . Th us a 
-------
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person is under disability if, because of the extent to which he 
is mentally disordered, he is unable to plead, or to understand 
the nature or purpose of the proceedings, or to communicate 
adequately with a solicitor for the purpose of conducting a defence. 
Section 39C of the Act provides that if, before the hearing or 
preliminary hearing of the information alleging the offence, the 
Judge is satisfied on medical evidence that the person is mentally 
disordered, he has to determine whether the person is under disability . 
If so, a finding of disability must be recorded. 
It i~ clear that mental disorder, of itself, does not amount to 
unfitness. What is less clear is the degree of disability required. 
For example, is it necessary that the defendant be able to arrive at 
a thoroughly rational decision as to his or her plea, be able to 
understand the legal issues and procedural intricacies of the case 
and be able to give impeccable instructions to his or her counsel? 
In a classic mid-nineteenth century case, the trial judge stressed 
that "it is not enough that the accused may have a general capacity 
98 
of communicating 0n ordinary matters." Jurors in that case were 
told that the accused must understand the details of the trial. 
However, the case law has evolved considerably since then and 
indicates that today, the requirements are on a much lower level. The 
view that the accused must be able to instruct counsel II properly", 
must be "properiy able" to defend himself and able to give "proper" 
evidence and make "proper" decisions was rejected in R. v. Robertson~
9 
--
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Per h a p s the mos t care f u 11 y f or mu 1 ate d ex pr e s s i on of t he " u n de r s ta n d i n g" 
· 1. J . R R b l OO test is that of Dev in . in . v. o erts: 
••• if there are no certain means of communicating 
with the defendant so that there are no certain 
means of making sure that he will follow as much as 
it is necessary that he should follow of the 
proceedings at his trial, then he should be found 
unfit to plead. 
Thus to be fit, the accused will need to understand that he or she 
is being charged with an offence, what it means to plead "guilty" 
or "not guilty", that there is a right to be defended, to call 
evidence in defence, to testify on his or her own behalf and to 
challenge jurors. 
The Common Law requirement that the accused be able to instruct 
counsel has been superseded in the statutory disability criteria 
by the lesser requirement that he or she be able to communicate 
adequately with a solicitor. A part of this may be that the accused 
recollect the events leading up to and surrounding the commission 
of the alleged crime. 101 In the leading case of R. v. P odola, 
it was held that temporary loss of memory at the time of commission 
of the crime did not render an accused unfit to stand trial. But 
the implication is that where the amnesia is sym1ptomatic of an 
organic or functional disorder affecting the accused's fitness, then 
he or she may well be so unfit. Indeed, Parker C.J. in delivering 
the Court's decision, stated: 102 
We cannot see that it is in accordance either with reason 
or com~on sense to extend the meaning of the word to 
include persons who are mentally n,)rmal at the time of the 
hearing of the proceedinqs against them, and are perfectly 
capable of instructing their solicitors as to what submissions 
------
1ml 
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their counsel is to put forward with reg~rd to 
commission of the crime. 
The gradations of severity of retardation mean that while some IH 
defendants will be within the statutory disability criteria, others 
will be quite capable of standing trial. The criteria relate 
specifically to intelligence, memory and the ability to concentrate, 
communicate and take part in decisions. Of the common problems 
associated with intellectual handicap, poor memory, short attention 
span, difficulties in abstract thinking and speech impairments will 
be relevant in determining disability. 
Clearly either party to the proceedings, or the court itself, can 
,~ise the issue of fitness. Defence counsel may be in a difficult 
position where he or she has doubts as to the client's mental 
abilities. Although the client may object to the issue being 
raised (whether counsel will respect this wish in turn depends on 
whether the client is able to adequately communicate), there is also 
a duty to the court to help it arrive at the truth. 
At Common Law, where the issue of fitness arose at the instance of 
the prosecution, the burden of proving the fact had to be discharged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the defence raised the issue, the 
burden was discharged simply by proof on the balance of probabilities.
103 
There is no reason to suppose that this has not been carried through 
to s. 3 9C • 
Subsections (4) and (5) of s.39C enable the court to postpd>ne 
consideration of the disability question if, in its opinion, it would 
be to the accused's advantage to do so. At any trial or hearing) 
consideration of the issue may be postponed until any time up to the 
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opening of the case for the defence. At any preliminary hearing, 
it may be postponed until any time before the court determines 
whether the person is to be committed to the High Court. Thus 
where the prosecution has not established a prima facie case, the 
information may be dismissed or the accused acquitted without the 
question of disability being considered. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has proposed a reform of the 
procedure in respect of the Canadian equivalent of s.39C, which 
would allow the judge to postpone determination of the disability 
issue to the end of the trial.
104 
There would thus be full 
adjudication on the substantive issues of the case before the accused 
risks indefinite detention on the ground of unfitness. The 
Commission made the following specific proposals. 
The trial judge may order a hearing on the accused's fitness 
immediately once the issue is raised. Upon request by either party, 
or where the trial judge considers that it would be in the interests 
of justice to do so, the determination may be postponed until the 
end of the case for the prosecution. 
After presenbation of the case for the prosecution, the trial judge 
w0uld have three possibilities: on motion by the defence he may 
either acquit the accused or postpone the issue to the end of the 
trial, or he may order a hearing of the accused's fitness to stand 
trial. Determination of the disability issue would only be postponed 
to the end of the trial where defence counsel has demonstrated that 
he or she has a case to present and that it would be in the interests 
of justice to proceed on the merits of the charge. 
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Where the trial is by a judge sitting alone, consideration of 
the issue is simply postponed to the end of the trial, where1.,1pon 
the judge has two alternatives: either to acquit the accused or 
direct that the issue of fitness be determined. If the accused is 
found not to be under disability, then a conviction is entered. 
Where the trial is by jury, the procedure would be somewhat different. 
The judge would postpone consideration of the issue until all the 
evidence at the trial had been heard. The jury would then be 
directed to consider the guilt or innocence of the accused. A 
verdict of "not guilty" would mean that the accused is acquitted and 
there would be no fitness hearing. Where the jury considers the 
accused to be guilty of the charge, it would deliver a conditional 
verdict of "guilty if fit". The issue of fitness would then be 
determined by the judge. If the accused is unfit, the judge would 
set aside the jury's conditional verdict and make an order for the 
disposition of the unfit accused. 
Subject to provision being made for the trial judge to direct that 
the jury deliver either an acquittal or a conditional verdict, the 
Commission's proposals should be adopted in New Zealand. They 
remove the risk of indefinite detention of an innocent person and 
reduce the risk of the defence's case being jeopardised by the 
further passage of time involved in the hearing of the issue. They 
secure the very purpose of the fitness rule, ·namely, to protect the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. The only problem foreseen with 
implementation of the proposals is that in the case of a trial by jury, 
it may introduce difficulties into the delimitation of the functions 
of judge and jury such that a jury, uncertain of the significance of 
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• I • 1 I its conditional verdict, may instead return a verdict of not gu1 ty. 
This problem need not, however, arise if the legislation that would 
have to be enacted properly sets out the procedures and the jury is 
given proper directions by the judge. 
A finding of disability by no means "licenses every illiterate moron 
to v i o l ate t he l a w with i m pu n i t y " • On the contrary,it is followed 
by an order under s.39~(l)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act that the 
person be detained in a hospital as a special patient. The effect 
of the order is to adjourn the proceedings until the person ceases 
to be under disability. If the person is subsequently transferred 
to committed patient status, the proceedings are stayed. 
Very few persons are detained as special pati~nts in psychiatric 
hospital s pursuant t o s • 3 9{i. ( l ) ( a ) • There were only seven i n 1 9 7 9 , 
seven in 1980 and six in 1981. In both 1979 and 1980, only one such 
patient was IH. No IH person was detained µursuant to s.39G-(l)(a) 
in either 1981 or 1982. This reflects the fact that in practice, 
where a psychi~tric report indicates a disability such that the 
person is unfit to plead, the prosecution will be withdrawn and 
l 05 
no finding of disability will be made. 
(c) Diversion by means of a finding of insanity 
The criminal law assumes an accused to be sane at the time of 
commission of an alleged offence. The presumption may be rebutted 
by the judge or the accused raising the question of insanity and 
the successful pleading of the defence of insanity under s.23 of 
the Crimes Act 1961. The accused will be acquitted on the grounds 
of insanity. 
Section 23(2) provides that: 
------
-
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No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason 
of an act done or omitted by him when labouring under 
natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an 
extent as to render him incapable -
(a) of understanding the nature and quality of the 
act or omission; or 
(b) of knowing that the act or omission was morally 
wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards 
of right and wrong. 
The insanity defence will not often be raised where an IH person 
has been charged with a crime. The main reason for this is that 
any case in which the defence could have been viable by reason of 
the person's natural imbecility or disease of the mind will usually 
have been siphoned off at an earlier stage with an informal out of 
court settlement or a finding of disability. 
If raised, the defence is unlikely to succeed in respect of an IH 
offender. Although there will usually be no difficulty in 
establishing that at the time of commission of the offence the LH pei::-soo 
was labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind,
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it will be more difficult to prove that the person did not understand 
the nature and quality of the act or omission, or did not know that 
it was morally wrong. 
Whether th e IH person understands the nature and quality of the act 
of omission depends on the degree of retardation as well as on 
the nature of the offence. Most IH offenders are only mildly or 
moderately r e tarded and will have a fair idea of what they are doing. 
This appl1es especially in respect of offences involving liability 
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for consequences. For exampl~, an IH person who picks up a gun, 
aims it at someone ond pulls the trigger is likely to realise 
the consequences of his or her actions. Similarly, it has been 
suggested that most IH offenders will know that their act or omission 
l 07 was morally wrong. 
Under s.39E of the Criminal Justice Act, if on the trial on 
indictment of a person charged with an offence it appears in evidence 
that the person was insane at the time of commission of the alleged 
offence, and he is acquitted, the jury are required to find 
specifically whether he was insane at that time, and to declare 
whether he was acquitted on account of his sanity. 
The expected consequence of an acquittal on account of insanity 
is that the court will order the person's detention as a special 
patient pursuant to s.39G(l)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act. 
Section 39G(2) provides for three alternative courses which the 
court may adopt. Thus, where the court considers that it would be 
safe in the public interest to do so, it may order that the person be 
detained as a committed patient in a psychiatric hospital, or that 
the person be immediately released, or it may decide not to make 
any order under the section if the person is subject to a sentence 
of imprisonment or detention that has not expired. 
The matters to be considered by a court in exercising its discretion 
under s.39G(l) and (2) following an acquittal on account of insanity 
were canvassed by R o per J . in R . v • G H : 1 O 8 
-
-
-
-
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The fact that the individual poses no threat to 
the public is not conclusive of the matter. What m~ght 
be in the best interests of the individual is not 
conclusive of the matter. All the circumstances must 
be considered quite apart from the individual's mental 
state •.• While no element of retribution or deterrence 
is involved, .•• there still remains some wider element 
of public interest, quite apart from its safety, and quite 
apart from what might be in the best interests of the 
individual involved where that interest and the public's 
coincide ••• The gravity of the charge is of considerable 
importance in considering an application such as this. 
The accused in that case was acquitted, on grounds of insanity, of 
a triple murder. It was accepted that he no longer posed any threat 
to the public interest. Roper J. rejected the contention that his 
mental condition justified a regular committal order and made an 
order that the accused be detained as a special patient under 
s.39G(l)(b). 
The implications of this decision are not necessarily unfavourable 
to the IH offender. Depending on the nature and seriousness of 
the offence committed, the court will have regard to his or her 
well-being in deciding which order to make. It will have regard 
to all the circumstances of the case. In appropriate cases, counsel 
for the IH accused may stress the unsuitability and ineffectiveness 
of psychiatric detention 109 and the availability of community 
alternatives for the care and treatment of the IH person. 
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The statistics indicate that ·the courts would seem to exercise 
equally their discretion to order the detention of any accused 
acquitt e d on account of insanity as either a special or a committed 
patient. In 1979, five persons were detained as special patients 
pursuant to s.39G(l)(b), two of whom were IH; four were thus 
detained in 1980, none of whom were IH, two in 1981 (neither 
were IH). One IH patient was detained under s.39G(l)(b) in 1982. 
As committed patients pursuant to s.39G(2), five persons were 
detained in 1979, none of whom were IH; four persons were thus 
detained in 1980, one of whom was IH; three persons were thus 
detained in 1981, none of whom were IH. Two IH persons were 
detained as committed patients pursuant to s.39G(2) in 1982. 
It ' is not known in how many cases the courts, following an acquittal 
on account of insanity, made an order for the person's immediate 
release or made no order at all under s.39G. 
( d ) Diversion by means of a committal upon conviction 
Instead of passing sentence on a person convicted of an offence, the 
court may make an order under s.39J of the Criminal Justice Act that 
the person be detained as a committed patient in a psychiatric 
hospital. It may do so if satisfied on medical evidence that the 
person is mentally disordered and that his mental condition requires 
that he be detained in a psychiatric hospital either in his own 
interest or for the safety of the public. 
Many more offenders are diverted to the mental health system 
pursuant to this section than pursuant to any other section in the 
Criminal Justice Act. In 1979, ninetytwo persons were committed 
under s.39J, twelve of whom were IH; one hundred and two persons 
were thus committed in 1980, nineteen of whom were IH; twentythree 
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persons were thus committed in 1981, twentyone of whom were IH. 
Eighteen IH persons were committed under s.39J in 1982. 
In the absence of data as to the number of IH and other possibly 
mentally disordered offenders convicted by the courts, it is not 
possible to know the true extent to which the power under s.39J 
is invoked. 
However, the appropriate use of the procedure was recently 
considered by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R. v. Elliot.
110 
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The Court stated: 
It is not sufficient that the medical practitioners 
consider that the treatment and rehabilitation of the 
offender is desirable in the public interest. It is 
not sufficient that they consider it desirable that he 
should be involuntarily committed to a mental hospital. 
They must consider his detention to be necessary in his 
own interest or for the safety of the public Under 
s.39J the medical certificate must establish that so long 
as he is at large in the community the offender is a 
danger to other persons. 
The Court further recognised that the principle of proportionality 
must be given proper weight. Thus if an order under s.39J would 
be disproportionate to the gravity of the offence of which the 
person was convict e d, yet committal is thoughtnecessary, then the 
ordinary civil committal procedures under the Mental Health Act 
should be used. 
.. ' 
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In 1983, the Legal Information Service - Mental Health Foundation 
Task Force on Revision of Mental Health Legislation stated in its 
Report that in light of the Elliott decision, it considered the 
procedures under s.39J to be generally satisfactory. 
It did, however, make some recommendations in respett of s.39J. 
The first was that the Elliott holding relating to proportionality 
be incorporated into the section. The second was that the Court 
should have upon conviction of a person, the power to place that 
pecson under personal guardianship or a community-care order if 
in-p~tient treatment is not required. 
(e) Diversion by means of a civil or a voluntary committal 
The involvement of an IH person in criminal proceedings may, as 
has been indicated, lead to a civil or a voluntary committal of 
that person to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to the procedures 
contained in s.19 to s.24 or s.15 of the Mental Health Act 1969. 
A consideration of committal and admission procedures under the Mental 
Health Act is beyond the scope of this study; the possibility is 
therefore no more than adverted to. Furthermore, the civil or 
voluntary committal of an IH person who has been involved in criminal 
proceedings need not necessarily result only from his or her criminal 
behaviour but may be the culmination of a variety of other factors 
as well, for example, a lack of persons willing or able to care for 
him or her, a recognised psychiatric disturbance in addition to the 
retardation, or general social misconduct. 
- B. 
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Criminal Justice or Mental Health System? - The 
Relative Merits 
As was seen in th e preceding sections, the IH accused may be 
processed through the court system in the normal way and be either 
acquitted or convicted of the offence charged, or may be diverted 
to the mental health system pursuant to various provisions in the 
Criminal Justice Act and Mental Health Act. This section examines 
the desirability of and problems involved in each of these courses. 
1. TAe IH in penal and correctional institutions 
The IH person convicted of a crime may be sentenced in the same 
manner as any other convicted offender. Depending on the nature 
and seriousness of the crime committed, the degree of handicap and 
any other factors the court may consider relevant, this may be a 
seatence of preventive detention (specifically in respect of sexual 
offences committed by a person over twenty five years of age), 
periodic detention, community service or any other sentence of 
imprisonment with the possibility of a release on probation. Or 
the person may simply be ordered to pay a fine. 
Leaving aside the general shortcomings of the New Zealand penal 
system and general theories as to the validity of imprisonment as 
a means of punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence or otherwise, 
whether a sentence of imprisonment will be approp~iate in respect of 
an IH offender will depend very much on the individual circumstances 
of each case. 
Punishment and detention of any kind cannot be justified where the 
person is so retarded as to be unable to understand it, where the 
offence committed was not serious and where the person is not 
dangerous. 
---
-
---
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In many other cases, however~ there is no real reason to 
distinguish IH offenders from "normal" offenders in terms of the 
validity of penal detention. The overall purposes allegedly served 
by a sentence of imprisonment - punishment, incapacitation, 
deterrence, retribution - will generally apply equally to IH and 
other offenders. But the rehabilitation of the IH offender is 
another matter. In fact the main question is whether a term of 
imprisonment is likely to be more destructive of the IH prisoner 
than of another. 
Many IH fit in quite well to the prison environment. The routine, 
the imposed discipline and the lack of responsibility are in fact 
likely to be more easily accepted by an IH prisoner than by other 
prisoners. The problem is that the deprivations and restrictions 
involved in the imprisonment will not necessarily be related in the 
mind of the IH offender to the criminal conduct for which he or 
she was sentenced. In some, the prison regime may only strengthen 
anti-social attitudes and feelings of frustration, as it may in the 
case of many other "normal" prisoners. The main problem for an IH 
inmate will be peer acceptance. He or she will be a prime target 
for abuse, exploitation and degradation, and is likely to rank lowly 
in the prisoner hierarchy. 
Given the small number of IH inmates,
112 it is not surprising that 
New Zealand penal institutions provide no special programmes 
or training for them. This is also due to a general lack of staff 
and financial resources, which even if available in greater 
abundance would probably be directed to special programmes for other 
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larger and equ a lly de s e rving groups, such as sex offenders or 
alcohol and drug addicts. The IH will be incorporated into existing 
training programmes and assigned tasks according to their 
b ·1·t· 113,114 a 1 1 1es. 
As a generalisation, a sentence of imprisonment cannot be said to 
harm the IH more than it may other offenders. Much will depend on 
the deg r e e of h an d i c a p , t h e t y pe of per s on an d t h e l en g t h of t he 
term of imprisonment. 
2. The suitability of psychiatric diversion of the IH 
Diversion to the mental health system is an option which must remain 
open to the courts in those circumstances where mental disorder is 
considered to ne~ate criminality or where it is considered to take 
priority over criminality in terms of what is to be done with a 
particular offender. Thus social control can still be exercised 
but in a setting geared to treating the disorder rather than 
punishing for "criminal" behaviour. 
T.S. Szasz has pointed to the dangers of psychiatric diversion. 115 
He argues that psychiatric diversion undermines both our criminal 
justice system and the social fabric of our society, partly because 
the diversion itself subverts the rule of law, partly because the 
rhetoric of diagnosis and therapy diverts attention from the fact 
of wrongdoin g and the moral legitimacy of punishment. He explains 
thfs by stating that the rule of law requires that the innocent b 0 
left at liberty and that the guilty be punished. The former 
requirement often makes people feel guilty at not being able to 
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control others who annoy or offend them, while the latter often 
makes people feel guilty for having to punish those guilty of 
lawbreaking. Psychiatric diversion comes into play to subvert the 
rule of law by providing a mechanism that simultaneously allays 
citizens' guilt for punishing certain acts and actors and 
satisfies their need for security by depriving certain acts of 
their legitimacy and certain actors of their liberty. It does so 
by treating certain actors as mentally disordered and their acts 
as symptoms of their disorder, for which they are not responsible, 
but for which society may justly impose compulsory "therapeutic" 
measures on them. 
This challenge to the theory underlying psychiatric diversion does 
contain an eleme~t of truth ~ ; but proceeds on a narrow view of the 
meaning of "rule of law". Surely the real argument must be that 
the rule of law is subverted by an informal process which condemns 
someone to a period of custody without the benefit of legal trial. 
This is not the case with psychiatric diversion. When diversion 
occurs, it is a formal process regulated by law, not an arbitrary 
exercise of power in the face of which the individual is helpless. 
The challenge further proceeds on the questionable assumption that 
focusin9 on the fact of wrongdoing and the legitimacy of punishment 
is the basis of our criminal justice system and is the only way of 
preserving the social fabric of our society. Criminal justice 
in New Zealand - and this is supported by the whole tenor of the 
Crimruaal Justice Act - treats neither the fact of wrongdoing nor 
the legitimacy of punishment as the paramount considerations in 
achieving justice in all cases. The individual circumstances and 
• 
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needs of the offender may be ·considered to be equally important. 
Psychiatric diversion must be seen not as an undermining of the 
criminal justice system, but rather as a recognition of its 
limitations in respect of certain acts and actors. Where a mentally 
disordered offender is not legally responsible for his or her actions 
and cannot therefore be punished for them, the criminal justice 
system has nothing to offer either that person or society. But 
where the person requires psychiatric treatment, or where the public 
need for protection warrants his or her detention, then the mental 
health system can provide the necessary service. Hence the value 
of psychiatric diversion, where appropriately used. 
Nevertheless, psychiatric diversion is totally inappropriate in the 
case of IH offenders. 
Its first goal, namely~the offer of psychiatric care and treatment, 
cannot apply to the IH. Unless suffering additionally from a mental 
illness, psychiatric care and treatment can do nothing for the IH 
person. No measure of drugs, individual or group therapy, electro-
convulsive therapy or indeed any other form of psychiatric treatment 
can increase the IH person's intelligence and decrease his or her 
difficulties in learning or social adaptation. Further, the 
abnormal environment of the psychiatric hospital, with its dismal 
population of psycopaths, manic depressants and schizophrenics, is 
an enormous obstacle to any intellectual, emotion or personality 
de v e 1 o pm e n t i n m o s t I H pe o pl e • As the members of the Oakley 
Inquiry stated, in response to submissions of the NZSIH focus inj 
on the needs of IH persons: "We believe that Oakley Hospital is a 
quite i na ppr opr i ate place for intellectually handicapped persons 
to be cared for. Such people should be looked after in quite 
separate institutions •.. 11116 
• 
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Nor can the second possible goal of psychiatric diversion, namely, 
to protect the community, apply entirely to IH persons. Normally, 
psychiatric detention satisfies this need for two reasons. First, 
it guarantees the removal of the offending person from society. 
Second, it enables treatment of the person such that he or she 
be returned "safe" to society. Only the first consideration can 
apply to the IH offender. 
The complete inappropriateness of psychiatric detention in respect 
of the IH forms the basis of the NZSIH's main submission to the 
Department of Health on current proposals for Reform of the Mental 
Health Act. The submission is ttat "mental . subnormality 11 be 
excluded fromthe Act's definition of "mental disorder"; thus both 
that Act and the provisions of Part VA of the Criminal Justice Act 
would no longer apply to IH persons. Instead, a shift to 
responsibility with the Department of Social Welfare and community-
based care is envisaged. This position is also adopted by the 
Health Department in its ~osition Paper on reform of the Mental 
Health Act. 
In discussing the problems of psychiatric diversion of IH offenders, 
the distinction must, however, be drawn between remand patients 
and special or committed patients. 
Although it may be necessary to determine whether an IH person is 
fit to stand trial or falls within the statutory definition of 
insane, or the relevance of his or her handicaps to the question 
of sentencing, there is no need for the person to be detained in a 
psychiatric hospital for the purpose of the examination. Clause 116 
of the Criminal Justice Bill in fact emphasises that psychiatric 
detention of remandees should be ordered only where strictly necessary. 
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In their present form, the remand provisions may, however, be 
beneficially used in the case of an IH person remanded in order to 
determine his or her fitness to stand trial. The utility of the 
prqcedures under both s.398 and s.47A is apparent when one considers 
that the actual examination time need only comprise a small part of 
the remand period. Under s.398, the person may be remanded to 
a psychiatric hospital for up to two months. While subsection (8) 
only authorises the administration of medical treatment or procedures 
necessary to prevent deterioration of the person's health, it does 
not preclude the remand period being used to "coach" the IH patient 
on what the trial is all about in order that he or she be found fit 
to stand trial. Such coaching would not entail the administration 
of medical treatment or procedures. 
Although the period of a remand under s.47A(2)(c) is limited to 
one month, that section envisages the possibility that the psychiatric 
report obtained after a remand pursuant to s.398 recommend further 
detention for examination, despite the two month time limit under 
s.39B. Thus under s.47A(2)(c), the person may be detained for a 
further period of one month, extending the time theoretically 
available for coaching to three months. 
The possibility of the remand provisions being used in this manner 
was referred to by the Canadian author, Schiffer, on the basis of 
i t . ·th f . h. t · t 117 It f ·b·1· · commun ea ion wi orensic psyc 1a ris s. s easi 1 ity in 
certain cases has also the support of NZSIH staff consulted. 
The success of such coaching would depend on the degree of 
re t ardation (specifically, intelligence and powers of concentration) 
as well as on the patient's incentive to learn and become fit. It 
is quite possible for a more mildly retarded person to gain the 
necessary understanding within the two month or three month time 
84. 
1 . ·t 118 l. ml. • It would also depend on the availability of staff 
to do the coaching. There is a widespread lack of qualified 
psychiatric staff in NewZealand hospitals. However, NZSIH staff 
or other persons may be allowed to visit the IH patient for 
coaching purposes by the hospital superintendent.
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There is no evidence that the remand provisions are in fact used 
in this manner, but the possibility nevertheless exists and could 
be put to good use to prevent :further diversion of the IH person to 
tre mental health system and to enable the processing of the case 
120 
through the courts in the normal way. 
The detention of IH persons as special or committed patients is 
unjust and unnec e ssary in itself for the reasons explained above. 
The injustice is capped when one considers that in theory, the order 
for detention as a special or committed patient may last indefinitely. 
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As the Task Force on Revision of Mental Health Legislation stated: 
At pr e s e n t , t he f at e of s p e c i a 1 pat i e n t s i s a l m o s t 
entirely within the discretion if the Minister of Health 
and the Minister of Justice. 
transfer of a special patient 
One or other may order the 
b k . 
1123 d. a c t o pr 1. s o rr, 1. re c t 
that a special patient's status be changed 
c o mm i t t e d pat i en t ;~ 
2 ;} d i r e c t t h e d i s c ha r g e 
patient Jl= 2~ or advise the Governor-General 
to that of 
of a special 
as to change 
of status or discharge decisions if the patient was 
charged with an offence punishable by life imprisonment 
or for a term of fourteen years. 
[!2~ 
In respect of persons detained as special patients following a 
finding of disability. the same power to review the order is 
126 
conferred on a High Court Judge. 
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The criteria upon which the change of status or discharge decisions 
are based relate essentially to whether the person's mental 
condition requires his or her continued detention as a special 
patient. 
Similarly, an order for detention as a committed patient lasts until 
the hospital superintendent or the Minister of Health considers 
the patient "fit to be discharged •11127 
Because the condition warranting the IH person's committal to 
a psychiatric hospital is not one from which he or she can ever 
recover, the order for detention may therefore last indefinitely. 
The arguments most frequently put forward in favour of indeterminate 
detention of the mentally disordered are largely inapplicable in 
respect of the IH. The flexibility of the sentence, usually 
perceived as an incentive to be cured, is unlikely to have any 
significance for an IH patient. He or she cannot be cured of the 
handicap. Nor is the IH person likely to understand that discharge 
depends on him or her. If the I H per s on d o e s under s tan d t h at the 
duration of the detention depends on his or her improvement, this 
very flexibility may only lead to a narrow view of the hospital 
staff as judges rather than therapists. This will impede any 
improvement in the condition. 
The argument that the indefinite detention is justified in the 
interests of public safety can only apply to those IH persons who 
are considered dangerous. 
.. ' 
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Although in theory detention as a special or committed patient 
is indefinite, in practice, the leave of absence provisions of 
the Mental Health Act may be invoked so as to curtail .the 
period of detention. Under s.66 of the Act, any committed patient 
may be granted leave of absence from the hospital for up to twelve 
months by the Superintendent or the Director of the Division of 
Mental Health of the Department of Health. T~ leave is extendable 
more or less permanently, provided each extension does not exceed 
twelve months. In other words, the patient may be ordered to return 
to the hospital for a notional time in order that the leave be re-
extended for a further period. A large number of committed 
patients are in fact absent on leave.
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Leave of special patients is governed by s.47 of the Mental Health 
Act. A person acquitted on account of insanity who is detained as 
a special patient may be granted indefinite leave by the Minister 
of Health (or by the Governor-General in Council in certain cases) 
if two medical practitioners certify that the patient is fit to be 
absent from the hospital. Special patients detained following a 
finding of disability may only be granted leave for up to seven days. 
IH patients, provided they are not considered dangerous, may be prime 
candidates for leave of absence. A psychiatric hospital cannot 
offer them care and treatment of the kind required and their 
continued detention is therefore unnecessary. Any condition may be 
attached to the granting of leave to committed patients or special 
patients detained following an acquittal on account of insanity. A 
condition that the IH person reside at an IHC facility or attend an 
IHC centre in order that appropriately qualified staff be able to 
care for the person in view of his or her criminal behaviour could 
be both beneficial to the individual concerned as well as socially 
v.aluable. 
8 7 • 
Despite the practical possibility of the leave provisions being 
invoked, the indefinite detention of an IH person in a psychiatric 
hospital cannot be justified. 
Where an IH person is found to be under disability, it is suggested 
that the court be able to make one of the following orders: 
1) An order releasing the accused immediately. This would be 
appropriate for the more severly retarded accused who poses no 
threat to either himself or society and who will never cease to 
be "under disability". 
2) An order that the accused reside~ or attend an IHC facility 
or receive sor.ie other appropriate form of treatment. This would be 
appropriate for the more mildly or moderately retarded accused who 
poses no threat to himself or to society. The order would be 
subject to reindictment and trial if the person can be trained to 
develop sufficient understanding to stand trial. 
The main problem with this order would be that IHC or the community 
agency chosen may be reluctant to receive the accused. In the case 
of an IHC facility, the person may be seen as an undesired "criminal" 
element amongst an otherwise normal IH population. 
3) An order for mandatory detention where the IH accused does pose 
a threat to himself or to society. It is recognised that at present 
this would have to be within the confines of a ~psychiatric hospital. 
Detention in a psychiatric hospital following an acquittal on account 
of insanity cannot, as has been seen, be justified on the basis of 
the IH person's need for treatment. 
I 
88. 
Where the person is not dangerous, the court may, at present, make 
an order for his or her immediate release. Where some form of 
detention is required, it is proposed that the court be able to 
make a personal guardianship order of the kind envisaged by the 
Dependent Persons Bill 1983, or make an order that the person be 
placed under the care and control of a community agency such as IHC 
or of a psychopaedic hospital (which would be more geared to treating 
the needs of an IH person than a psychiatric hospital). 
Where the IH person is convicted of an offence but the court 
considers that some form of care and treatment is necessary and 
that a sentence of imprisonment would be inappropriate, it is 
suggested that the court have the power to place the person under 
a personal guardianship or community care order as suggested 
by the Task Force on Revision of Mental Health Legislation.
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PART VI. CONCLUSIOJ 
About one hundred years a g o, Justice Oliver i!endell Holmes wrote : 
"An indi vicl.ual may be morally wi tl:,out stain because he has less than 
ordinary intelligence or prudence, but he is req_uired to have those 
130 q_uali ties at his peril." 
Harsh as this may sound, the fore go ing ex2mination of the fe.te of 
the IH person who becomes enmeshed in the criminal justice system would 
inclicate ti1c,t in the majority of cases, this is still true today. The 
ret a r dation ;-:hich mc.:.y it se lf c::.ccount for the crimina l behaviour of an 
IH psrson has been seen to be c c1pable of creatin5 unusua.l pressures for 
crimina l justice personnel. While the police generally respond ade~uately 
to tnes e 1->ressures, t ::i e fre q_uent inability of the juciici a ry to accord. 
due and proper recognition to the fact of retaruation means that in 
many c ase s, justice c 2..n:10t at present be guaranteed for the IH offender. 
',Jhile only a small percent ag·e of the I0,C00 or so j,)ersons uho mah.e up 
New Zealand's IH population will ever become involve d in the crimina l 
jus tic e SJStcn, thi s o..oes not ·.:a rrant a maintenance of the status qua. 
Not only are brea-;;er public av,areness of and. le6-al education in intel-
lectual h2 ... 'ldicap recuirea., but clearly leg islative reform is imperative 
if all I II offenders are to receive the kind of treatment that a truly enh'jl .. le.,~ec\ 
society would 5ive them. 
APPENDIX 1 
In this Appendix, the following abbreviations are used: 
MHA - Mental Health Act 1969 
CJA - Criminal Justice Act 1954 
TABLE 1 
ADMISSIONS BY LEGAL STATUS OF INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED 
PATIENTS TO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, 1979-1982. * 
STATUS 1979 1980 1981 1982 
INFORMAL 
COMMITTED 
SPECIAL 
REMAND 
s.19 MHA 
s.21 MHA 
s.23 MHA 
s.24 MHA 
s.39I CJA 
s • 3 9G ( 2) CJ A 
s.39J CJA 
Other Sections 
763 
74 
101 
1 
12 
6 
s.39G(l)(a) CJA 1 
s.39G(l)(b) CJA 2 
s.42 MHA l 
s.42(4) MHA l 
s.43 MHA l 
Other Sections 
s.39B(l) CJA 
s.39B(2) CJA 
s.47A(2)(c)CJA 
2 
1 
9 
TOT AL ALL IH PA TIEiH S 975 
777 
97 
119 
2 
4 
1 
19 
l 
3 
l 
6 
1030 
760 
96 
130 
l 
2 
l 
21 
2 
l 
1022 
697 
114 
114 
2 
2 
18 
4 
l 
3 
955 
* Data prepared for this study by the National Health Statistics 
Centre of the Department of Health. For administrative reasons, 
figures were not available for the years preceding 1979. The 
latest available figures are those for 1982. 
The diagnosis of mental retardation for these purposes is based on 
the International Classification of Diseases, introduced for mental 
health coding. "M e ntal r e tardation" is de fined in the ninth 
revision of the ICD as "a condition of arr e sted or incomplete 
develop~ent of mind which is especially characterised by 
subnormality of intelligence." The coding is made on the 
individual's current level of functioning without regard to its 
nature or causation. The assessment of intellectual level is 
based on whatever information is available, including clinical 
evidence of adaptive behaviour and psychometric findings. IQ 
levels ar e used only as a guide. 
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TABLE 2 
TOTAL ADMISSIONS BY LEGAL GROUPii~G TO PSYCHIATRIC 
HOSPITALS, 1979-19 82. * 
STATUS 1979 1980 1981 1982 
INFORMAL 10705 10855 10820 10799 
COMMITTED 3115 3568 3722 3921 
SPECIAL 109 116 111 119 
REMAND 330 298 331 306 
TOTAL 14259 14837 14985 15145 
* Source: National Health Statistics Centre, 1984. 
.. ' 
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TABLE 3 
TOTAL AD~1ISSIOilS BY LEG AL STATUS TO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, 
1979-1981. * 
STATUS 
INFORMAL 
COMMITTED 
SPECIAL 
REMAND 
s.19 MHA 
s.21 MH A 
s.23 MHA 
s.24 MHA 
s.39I CJA 
s.39G(2) CJA 
s. 39J CJA 
Other Sections 
No Section 
s.39G(l)(a) CJA 
s.39G(l)(b) CJA 
s.42 MHA 
s.42(4) MHA 
s.43 MHA 
Other Sections 
s. 3 98 (l) CJ A 
s.39B(2) CJA 
s.47A(2)(c) CJA 
Other Sections 
TOTAL ALL PATIENTS 
1979 
10705 
1616 
914 
26 
5 
l 
5 
92 
20 
436 
7 
5 
53 
19 
15 
10 
42 
2 
283 
3 
14259 
1980 
10855 
1929 
1028 
26 
6 
6 
4 
102 
7 
460 
7 
4 
70 
19 
11 
5 
57 
3 
236 
2 
14837 
1981 
10820 
2009 
l 051 
28 
16 
7 
3 
23 
6 
479 
6 
2 
64 
21 
9 
9 
61 
l 
268 
l 
14985 
* Source: Towards Mental He a lth Health Law Reform - Report of 
the Legal Inform a ti on Se rvi ce - :-te nt a l Hea lth F ound a tion Task 
Force on Revision of Mental Health Legislation (Mental Health 
Foundation of New Zealand, December 19 83) pp. 420-421. 
( i ) 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Hereinafter abbreviated to "IH". 
2 Hereinafter referred to as NZSIH, or IHC, according to 
the context. 
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